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 1 
I. INTRODUCTION  
A. IMPORTANCE  
Guatemala’s security problems, particularly its violent crime and impunity, are a 
concern to the United States. The combination of the civil war’s legacy of violence, a 
weak state, and modern security challenges creates a complex problem for Guatemala’s 
way ahead. According to Congressional Research Service reports, transnational crime 
with roots in Guatemala is an area of focus for U.S. policymakers. Drug traffickers have 
effective control over more than half of Guatemalan territory, while the United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) estimates that gang affiliation increased from 
14,000 to 22,000 members between 2007 and 2012.1 
The primary purpose of this thesis is to answer the following question: what 
factors explain the rise of violent crime in post-civil war Guatemala? The secondary 
focus of this thesis is to identify the transnational implications of Guatemala’s violence 
for U.S. policy. Guatemala’s critical security environment requires careful study of 
empirical information through theoretical frameworks, leading to the identification of 
root causes and potential corrective actions. 
While accounts of crime and violence in Guatemala are widely available, 
theoretical approaches designed specifically for this nation’s security issues are rare. In 
examining the available theoretical frameworks, this thesis attempts to fill in analytical 
gaps and contribute to the academic literature dealing with Guatemala’s violence problem 
and its transnational implications.  
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The majority of the literature concerning security issues in Guatemala is 
descriptive and based on journalistic and historical accounts. Various scholars, reporters, 
and international organizations have recounted in detail Guatemala’s environment of 
                                                
1 Clare Ribando Seelke, Gangs in Central America (Washington, DC: Congressional Research 
Service, February 20, 2014), 3, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34112.pdf; Maureen Taft-Morales, 
Guatemala: Political, Security, and Socio-Economic Conditions and U.S. Relations (Washington, DC: 
Congressional Research Service, August 7, 2014), 9,14, http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42580.pdf. 
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crime, violence, and corruption in order to bring awareness and further understand these 
problems. Only a few scholars, however, have formulated theories applicable to the 
explanation of Guatemala’s challenges. Therefore, this literature review is divided into 
three parts. First, it provides an overview of theoretical frameworks relevant to 
Guatemala’s security and justice problems. Second, it thematically compares approaches 
and arguments, and determines divergent and convergent ideas. Third, it identifies gaps 
in the discussed academic literature.  
1. Theoretical Frameworks 
In “‘Security Traps’ and Democratic Governability of Latin America,” John 
Bailey responds to the following question: “Why [have] political units (cities, regions, 
countries) and not others fall[en] into security traps in which crime, violence and 
corruption become mutually reinforcing in civil society, state, and regime and contribute 
to low quality democracy?”2 He answers this question with two theoretical models: 
positive equilibrium, which relates to efficient relationships between democracy and the 
security sector, and negative equilibrium, which relates to security traps.3 
Graham Ellison and Nathan W. Pino, in Globalization, Police Reform and 
Development: Doing It the Western Way?, promote a theoretical approach for 
understanding transnational crime and security based on the influences of neoliberalism 
and globalization. They discuss the impacts of the global economy network on the 
security sectors of developing countries.4 
James Mahoney offers a theoretical model directed at understanding and 
contrasting Central America’s various political outcomes. Mahoney’s work attempts to 
identify the root causes of Central America’s weak democracies, which one might argue 
is a contributing factor to Guatemala’s security problems. The framework for Mahoney’s 
                                                
2 John Bailey, “‘Security Traps’ and Democratic Governability in Latin America: Dynamics of Crime, 
Violence, Corruption, Regime, and State,” in Criminality, Public Security, and the Challenge to 
Democracy in Latin America, ed. Marcelo Bergman and Laurence Whitehead, 1st ed (Notre Dame, IN: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 2009), 251. 
3 Ibid., 252. 
4 Graham Ellison and Nathan Pino, Globalization, Police Reform and Development: Doing It the 
Western Way? (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012). 
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theory is path dependency. The analysis of Mahoney’s framework is based on three 
works from the author: The Legacies of Liberalism: Path Dependence and Political 
Regimes in Central America; “Radical, Reformist and Aborted Liberalism: Origins of 
National Regimes in Central America”; and “Path-Dependent Explanations of Regime 
Change: Central America in Comparative Perspective.”5 
In Policing Democracy: Overcoming Obstacles to Citizen Security in Latin 
America, Mark Ungar focuses on contemporary analyses, problem-solving approaches, 
and recommendations for comprehensive reforms in Latin America. Using a comparative 
perspective, he provides succinct theoretical insights into the origins of security problems 
in the region. Ungar’s work is predominantly based on the evolution (or lack of) 
community policing and the relationship between citizen protection and democracy.6 
In Violence in Peace: Forms and Causes of Postwar Violence in Guatemala, 
Heidrum Zinecker, a scholar from the University of Leipzig, provides a causal analysis of 
Guatemala’s high levels of crime and violence. Zinecker theorizes that Guatemala has 
two sets of violence-enabling structures: regime hybridity and a rent economy. 
Furthermore, she asserts that crime prevention structures—such as the police force and 
judicial system—are weak and, therefore, contribute to the problem.7 
2. Thematic Arguments 
A common feature in the described theories is spatial scale, which ranges from 
global to regional to country-centric frameworks. Ellison and Pino’s theory has a global 
approach. They argue that neoliberal globalization has had “profound effects on security 
sectors of many nations that include the police, other criminal justice agencies and 
                                                
5 James Mahoney, “Path-Dependent Explanations of Regime Change: Central America in Comparative 
Perspective,” Studies in Comparative International Development 36, no. 1 (2001): 111–141; James 
Mahoney, The Legacies of Liberalism: Path Dependence and Political Regimes in Central America 
(Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002); James Mahoney, “Radical, Reformist and 
Aborted Liberalism: Origins of National Regimes in Central America,” America Latina Hoy 57 (2011): 79–
115. 
6 Mark Ungar, Policing Democracy: Overcoming Obstacles to Citizen Security in Latin America, 1st 
ed (Washington, DC: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2011). 
7 Heidrin Zinecker, Violence and Peace: Forms and Causes of Postwar Violence in Guatemala, 1st ed 
(Frankfurt, Germany: Peace Research Institute of Frankfut (PFIF), 2006). 
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security organizations, militaries, and intelligence organizations.”8 They contend that 
globalization influences current security crises in developing countries. In contrast, 
Bailey, Mahoney, and Ungar use regional approaches in their theories. For these three 
scholars, comparing and contrasting is an important conjectural element as they devise 
hypotheses to explain regional problems. Bailey and Ungar explain the connection 
between democracy and security within the Latin American context while Mahoney 
focuses on Central America. Conversely, Zinecker’s theoretical approach is country-
centric, focusing exclusively on Guatemala. Similar to Mahoney, Zinecker makes 
comparisons within Central American countries but only to illustrate the unique character 
of Guatemala’s situation; she does not formulate a general explanation for the entire 
region.9 
The theories presented here are the work of respected scholars who have drawn 
from various methodologies. Mahoney’s theory is based on the application of 
comparative historical research. For instance, in Legacies of Liberalism, Mahoney 
comparatively analyzes Guatemala, El Salvador, Costa Rica, Honduras, and Nicaragua. 
In Policing Democracy, Ungar constructs his framework on field research and case 
studies in Honduras, Bolivia, and Argentina. Bailey’s Security Trap theory is 
comprehensive in nature and derived from empirical research in Latin American 
countries. Zinecker’s work is the result of causal and socio-structural approaches taken 
from criminology and applied to Guatemala. Finally, Ellison and Pino’s methodology is 
context sensitive, allowing transferability from country to country. They present seven 
case studies based on their theory: Afghanistan, Brazil, Iraq, Northern Ireland, South 
Africa, and Trinidad and Tobago.  
Additionally, the reviewed scholars base their theoretical frameworks on different 
time periods. Ungar constructs his theory in a linear sequence. He distills policing into 
three consecutive stages. First, in the 1800s, police forces were limited to sub-regions and 
controlled by local leaders. Next, in the 1900s, police forces became a national priority, 
improving administration and professionalism, yet weakening citizen participation in 
                                                
8 Ellison and Pino, Globalization, Police Reform and Development, 18. 
9 Zinecker, Violence and Peace, 2. 
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monitoring and preventing crime. Finally, in the 1960s and 1970s, community policing 
became prevalent in certain countries, and officers became more involved in their 
communities, earning the citizens’ trust.10 Ungar argues that Latin America did not reach 
the third stage, community policing, because twentieth-century military authoritarianism 
prevented it.11 In contrast, Bailey hypothesizes that for most of Latin America, critical 
security problems trace back to times of independence, strengthening in later phases such 
as the populist import substitution industrialization (ISI) period.12 Bailey briefly 
highlights the inevitable connection of historical events to modern realities: “The point to 
stress is that origins and trajectories figure fundamentally in current contexts of public 
security.”13 Unlike Ungar, Bailey does not divide Latin America’s security trajectory into 
phases, but rather, he sees it as an aggregation of significant events.  
Similar to Bailey’s theory, Mahoney’s path dependency arguments trace back to 
Latin America’s liberal reforms. Arguably, Mahoney’s model can be seen as a temporal 
construct. Mahoney explains that a “path-dependent approach emphasizes how actor 
choices create institutions at critical moments, how these institutions in turn shape 
subsequent actor behaviors, and how these actor responses culminate in the development 
of new institutional patterns.”14 Based on this sequential framework, Mahoney asserts the 
nineteenth-century liberal reform in Central America was the critical juncture that 
derived three major patterns of liberalism—radical, reformist, and aborted—to influence 
the various political regimes.15 Mahoney’s structural explanation of path dependency and 
outcomes in Central America is illustrated in Table 1. 
 
                                                
10 Ungar, Policing Democracy, 4. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Bailey, “‘Security Traps’ and Democratic Governability,” 260. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Mahoney, “Path-Dependent Explanations of Regime Change,” 115. 
15 Mahoney, The Legacies of Liberalism, 4. 
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Table 1.   Path-Dependent Regime Outcomes in Central America16 









































With regard to Guatemala, Mahoney claims that radical liberalism created the 
structural foundation for the development of an authoritarian military regime.17 He 
further explains that liberals favored capitalist growth at the expense of land reform, 
which undermined peasants, created polarized social classes, and established militarized 
mechanisms.18 Mahoney and Bailey contrast Ungar in attributing the period of liberal 
reform as the pivotal point for Guatemala; alternatively, Ungar believes structural 
changes started in the 1800s.19   
The works of Zinecker and Ellison and Pino focus on contemporary elements 
influencing security. Specific historical periods are not a factor for Zinecker; however, 
she makes substantial references to Guatemala’s weak democracy, which one could argue 
originated in the period of liberal reform. In this context, a precursor for Zinecker’s 
theory could be the relative prominence and success of democratization movements as 
Ungar postulates (see Table 1). Conversely, Ellison and Pino’s theoretical approach 
focuses on a specific modern-time period: neoliberal globalization.20 
                                                
16 From Mahoney, "Path-Dependent Explanations of Regime Change," 115. 
17 Mahoney, “Path-Dependent Explanations of Regime Change,” 119. 
18 Mahoney, “Radical, Reformist and Aborted Liberalism,” 222. 
19 Ellison and Pino, Globalization, Police Reform and Development, 18. 
20 Ibid. 
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With the exception of Ellison and Pino’s hypothesis, the level of democratic 
consolidation and the legacy of authoritarian regimes are principal themes among the 
scholars presented in this literature review. Mahoney suggests that, stemming from the 
liberal reform, the combination of polarized societies with militarized states became an 
impediment to the development of democracies.21 Furthermore, Mahoney links the 
impacts of military authoritarianism to the 1990s when the United Nations (UN) 
recognized that 200,000 people had died during the Guatemalan civil war.22 Therefore, 
Mahoney’s theory is relevant in studying Guatemala because it gives an explanation for 
the persistence and influence of the military and class polarization in this nation, leading 
to high crime, violence, and impunity. Zinecker states that neither democracy nor 
authoritarianism creates violence.23 Nevertheless, she explains that the highest levels of 
violence take place in semi-democracies or transitional democracies, which she calls 
hybrid regimes. She explains, “The possibility of a high intensity violence becomes 
reality when regime hybridity is present. This implies the existence of non-democratic 
regime segments such as political exclusion and the absence of the rule of law.”24 
According to this definition, Zinecker argues that Guatemala is a classic hybrid regime.25 
Likewise, Bailey and Ungar are interested in the relationship between democratic 
regime performance and the weaknesses of the security sector. In determining this 
relationship, Bailey offers a model applicable to Guatemala: negative equilibrium.26 The 
structure of Bailey’s negative equilibrium model, depicted in Figure 1, relates to security 
traps and relies on a corruptive feedback loop.27 
 
 
                                                
21 Mahoney, “Path-Dependent Explanations of Regime Change,” 119. 
22 Ibid., 128. 
23 Zinecker, Violence and Peace, I. 
24 Ibid., 39. 
25 Ibid., 21. 




Figure 1.  Public Security, State, and Regime: Negative Equilibrium28 
Overlapping clusters of the security sector (crime, violence, corruption, and 
impunity) are linked to the democratic regime or the state’s administrative apparatus by 
two causal paths, direct and mediated linkages. Direct linkages include activities such as 
tax evasion or intimidation of officials, while mediated linkages refer to the consequences 
of crime, violence, and corruption on civil society and the civil society attitudes toward 
these actions.29 Bailey points out that under negative equilibrium, “the legitimacy of the 
political unit is weak or absent. . . . In this model, elected and appointed officials, as a 
general practice, behave unethically and commit crimes or take the initiative to prey upon 
civil society in a variety of ways in order to extract resources or command obedience 
outside the formal law.”30 A quick assessment of Guatemala’s democratic stability and 
effectiveness of the security sector, as well as possible corruptive feedback responses, 
indicates that this nation fits well under Bailey’s model because of its direct and mediated 
linkages, such as political intimidation and low police performance.  
In analyzing the relationship between citizen security and democratic regimes, 
Ungar argues that weak democracies promote security crises. He states, “Citizen security 
has become a crisis in Latin America, primarily by feeding off the weakness of 
                                                
28 After Bailey, "'Security Traps' and Democratic Governability in Latin America: Dynamics of 
Crime, Corruption, Regime and State," 252; this reproduction is a simplified version of Bailey's graphic 
model. 
29 Bailey, “‘Security Traps’ and Democratic Governability,” 253–256. 
















Corrective or corruptive feedback  
Corrective or corruptive feedback  
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democracy.”31 Ungar’s theoretical approach to the current security problem in Latin 
America takes into account the endurance of weak democracies as well as the region’s 
inability to develop adequate police reforms after military authoritarianism. 
Arguments based on low democratic consolidation and authoritarian legacy lead 
toward further analysis of institutional weakness. In regard to the security sector Ungar 
declares, “In Latin America the public is increasingly seeing policing as not simply 
discriminatory or derivational, as in the past, but also illegitimate and unpredictable. . . . 
As a result, people usually do what they can to avoid the police, even when they are 
crime victims or witnesses.”32 Furthermore, Ungar explains that former authoritarian 
regimes used the police force and judicial system to control and manage the population 
instead of combating and prosecuting crime. As countries transitioned to democracy, he 
argues, the police maintained rigid structures, which created inefficiencies in the security 
sector. By the 1990s, crime was at a critical level and the police force inadequacies 
required significant reforms.33 Consequently, crime continues to be a critical problem 
even today.  
Similarly, Zinecker maintains that although the security and judiciary sectors 
could prevent violence, they perform poorly. She contends that the police force is ill-
equipped, under resourced, and corrupted.34 Correspondingly, the judicial system, 
Zinecker argues, is understaffed, neglected, hierarchical, and bureaucratic.35 
Additionally, she points out that Guatemala’s heavy hand, or mano dura, tactics and its 
military’s constitutional right to be involved in domestic affairs weaken the security 
sphere.36 Furthermore, Zinecker argues that these factors weaken institutional structures 
as retaliation and crime ultimately increases.37 She concludes, “Every gap in the judicial 
                                                
31 Ungar, Policing Democracy, 69. 
32 Ibid., 72. 
33 Ibid., 1; 4–5. 
34 Zinecker, Violence and Peace, 29–31. 
35 Ibid., 33–36. 
36 Ibid., 33. 
37 Ibid. 
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system means a possibility that, because the judicial sector performs poorly, the level of 
violence will rise because offenders who are not convicted immediately commit new 
offences.”38 Zinecker posits that impunity in Guatemala is rooted in the deficiencies of 
the security sector and the judicial system.  
On this subject, Ellison and Pino completely diverge from earlier arguments on 
democratization, the legacy of authoritarian regimes, and weak security and justice 
sectors. These scholars state, “The more one reads about police reform in transitional 
contexts, states exiting from authoritarian rule, process of democratization, NGO [non-
governmental organization] activity, donor aid and security sector reform, the more 
cynical one can become about the efficiency of such endeavors.”39 The economic 
dimension is at the center of Ellison and Pino’s theoretical approach. 
Three of the works analyzed in this review discuss security problems in terms of 
economic challenges. The most salient arguments in the economic dimension come from 
Ellison and Pino’s Globalization, Police Reform and Development. These scholars assert 
that the dynamics of neoliberal globalization enhance social inequality and create 
opportunities for “increases in predatory crime, particularly in areas where there are high 
concentrations of young unemployed males.”40 Furthermore, they contend neoliberal 
globalization threatens the state’s sovereignty, giving power to global allocators of capital 
such as the World Trade Organization (WTO).41 Ellison and Pino indicate that global 
mechanisms make it possible for organized crime to align with the government, 
contributing to corruption.  
Zinecker also makes an economy-based argument, not at the macro level, but 
country-specific. She explains that rent economy is a key factor underlying Guatemala’s 
violence and crime problem42 To define a central characteristic of rent economies, she 
refers to Hartmut Elsenhans’s work: “A marginal labor force whose members have the 
                                                
38 Ibid., 37. 
39 Ellison and Pino, Globalization, Police Reform and Development, 69. 
40 Ibid., 18. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Zinecker, Violence and Peace, 22. 
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physical prerequisites needed to produce more than they need . . . but who cannot do this 
because the means of production are too high.”43 According to Zinecker, a rent economy 
creates a condition in which availability of labor is low, encouraging violence as an 
alternative for income.44  
Zinecker, Ungar, and Bailey highlight social implications as possible factors 
contributing to Guatemala’s violence, crime, and corruption. Zinecker and Ungar discuss 
the poor performance of civil society as a contributing factor to insecurity. Zinecker says, 
“There is very little activity in Guatemala that could be described as participation by civil 
society in efforts to limit violence by democratic means.”45 She attributes this problem to 
post-civil war social fragmentation followed by the dynamics of broken families, 
immigration, and loss of indigenous values. Additionally, Zinecker explains that in the 
face of high crime rates and low security sector performance, the population compensates 
by creating vigilante groups.46 Likewise, Ungar associates social apathy to law and 
norms as contributing factors to the violence problem. He states, “Many ordinary citizens 
regard vigilantism as an expression of priority of safety over rights and as their own 
application of the state’s mano dura policy to achieve that priority.”47 These social 
expressions, Ungar argues, undermine the possibility of a constructive relationship 
between the civic sector and the democratic regime.48 
In a similar way, Bailey claims that in examining security trap associations, one 
can identify patterns and how citizens respond to such patterns.49 He conceptualizes that 
the negative equilibrium model is “the unfortunate state of affairs in which notions of law 
and norms of behavior in civil society differ markedly from formal law, the citizenry 
tolerates or promotes formally illegal exchanges, and the state and regime themselves act 
                                                
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid., 37. 
46 Ibid., 38. 
47 Ungar, Policing Democracy, 92. 
48 Ibid., 93. 
49 Bailey, “‘Security Traps’ and Democratic Governability,” 255. 
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as principal engines of crime, violence and corruption.”50 Therefore, according to 
Bailey’s theory, both the civil society and the regime, along with its mechanisms, create 
the problems of crime, violence, and corruption, which are regenerated by a feedback 
loop dynamics.51 
3. Gaps 
In addressing Guatemala's security issues, one obvious gap in the current 
scholarly literature is the scarcity of dedicated analysis of this nation. Comparative work, 
either at the global or regional levels, makes for an important and interesting part of 
research methodology. Yet very little theoretical work has been written exclusively for 
Guatemala; Zinecker’s Violence and Peace is one of few theoretical examples available 
in this category. In Legacies of Liberalism, Mahoney dedicates a chapter to Guatemala 
and El Salvador, but he predominantly discusses nineteenth-century radical liberalism. 
Ungar and Bailey make a few references to Guatemala but fall short of an in-depth 
discussion. Ellison and Pino’s global approach is possibly adaptable to various 
developing nations, but they make no reference to Guatemala in their book.  
Although the publications mentioned above are the work of respected scholars, a 
critical analysis brings forward some concerns. Striking similarities appear among the 
American scholars—Mahoney, Bailey, and Ungar—in terms of historical trajectory, 
regional approach, and consolidation of democracy. Yet, the works of Zinecker and 
Ellison and Pino, published in Germany and England respectively, offer different views 
and theoretical models for the security problem in Guatemala, varying in scale and scope. 
In particular, Ellison and Pino offer a completely different solution, one not based on 
democracy yet heavily grounded on modern factors influencing the entire world. In this 
regard, one might argue that limiting analysis to current economic, social, and political 
trends disregards the fact that violence and crime precede modern times.  
                                                
50 Ibid., 256. 
51 Ibid., 267. 
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C. HYPOTHESIS: MULTI-LAYERED PERSPECTIVES 
Zinecker points out that, if analyzed independently, neither hybrid democracies 
nor rent economies are reasons for violence, but in conjunction with weak institutions 
they become enabling factors.52 Furthermore, she acknowledges that Nicaragua, while 
also a hybrid regime and rent economy, does not experience the high levels of violence 
reported in Guatemala.53 Zinecker states that variations in institutional performance 
account for the difference. For this reason, she clarifies that causes of high-intensity 
violence and impunity are not linear but rather integral as part of structural 
socioeconomic configurations.54 Bailey agrees; he identifies the relationship between 
economic and demographic trends with institutional weakness as a crucial element in 
explaining the rise of criminal violence in mid-twentieth-century Latin America.55 
Drawing from the presented theories, themes, and arguments, as well as the gap analysis, 
this thesis hypothesizes that the causes of violence in Guatemala are the combination of 
weak institutional performance and a lack of social incentives. 
D. METHODOLOGY  
The research primarily draws from secondary sources including scholarly articles, 
political commentary, think-tank reports, and books dealing with security and 
democratization such as Criminality, Public Security and the Challenge to Democracy in 
Latin America by Marcelo Bergman and Laurence Whitehead. The research method takes 
a qualitative approach divided into three phases. The first phase, using contextual 
relevancy, historical inference, and empirical data, evaluates the aforementioned 
theoretical frameworks to identify the most suitable themes and arguments to answer the 
research question. The second phase uses empirical data and comparative case studies to 
validate or challenge selected arguments that potentially support this thesis hypothesis. 
The third phase consolidates plausible variables to test the hypothesis and draw 
                                                
52 Zinecker, Violence and Peace, 39–40. 
53 Ibid., 40. 
54 Ibid., 21–22. 
55 Bailey, “‘Security Traps’ and Democratic Governability,” 260. 
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conclusions, building on the current scholarly literature (see Figure 2). Subsequent 
analysis takes place as necessary.   
 
Figure 2.  Sample Research Methodology 
E. ARGUMENT SELECTION  
Scholars have linked the current levels of violence in Guatemala to a number of 
factors including socioeconomic issues and critical junctures in history.56 While these 
factors influence Guatemala’s current state of affairs, a comparative study based on 
empirical data indicates they do not explain the difference in violence rates between 
Guatemala and other Central American countries outside the Northern Triangle—
Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras. For instance, Nicaragua, a comparably poor 
country, also experienced 10 years of internal turmoil, which resulted in a great death toll 
(see Table 2). Yet today, Nicaragua does not experience violent crime to the extent of its 
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northern neighbors. Homicide rates in Nicaragua are a fraction of Guatemala’s reported 
homicides; in 2012, Guatemala’s murder statistics were almost four times higher than 
Nicaragua’s rates (see Table 3). Conversely, numerous economic indicators, such as 
gross domestic product, equality, and employment rates, are lower for Nicaragua than for 
Guatemala (see Table 4). Therefore, a comparison of empirical data demonstrates that 
neither a history of internal conflict nor economic elements serve as principal causes for 
the high levels of violent crime in contemporary Guatemala.  
Table 2.   Homicide Rates in the 20th-Century Civil Wars57 
 Guatemala Nicaragua 
Year 1960–1996 1977–1979 1981–1989 
Civil War (length) 36 years 2 years 9 years 
Total homicides 200,000 20,000 50,000 
Table 3.   Comparison of Homicide Rates (2004–2012)58  
Homicide Rates per 100,000 Population 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Guatemala 36.4 42.1 45.3 43.4 46.1 46.5 41.6 38.6 39.9 





                                                
57 After Zinecker, Violence and Peace, 18. 
58 From “Statistics on Crime Data,” United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), accessed 
January 10, 2015, http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/statistics/data.html. 
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Table 4.   Economic Indicators for Guatemala and Nicaragua59 
Economic Indicators  
 Guatemala Nicaragua 
GDP  
(purchasing power parity) 
$81.51 billion (2013 est.)  
$78.91 billion (2012 est.)  
$76.64 billion (2011 est.)  
note: data are in 2013 U.S. 
dollars 
$27.97 billion (2013 est.)  
$26.74 billion (2012 est.)  
$25.42 billion (2011 est.)  
note: data are in 2013 U.S. 
dollars 
GDP (per capita) 
$5,300 (2013 est.)  
$5,200 (2012 est.)  
$5,200 (2011 est.)  
note: data are in 2013 U.S. 
dollars 
$4,500 (2013 est.)  
$4,400 (2012 est.)  
$4,200 (2011 est.)  
note: data are in 2013 U.S. 
dollars 
Unemployment rate 4.1% (2011 est.)  3.5% (2010 est.) 
7.2% (2013 est.)  
5.9% (2012 est.)  
note: unemployment was 
46.5% in 2008 
Distribution of family 
income–Gini index 
55.1 (2007)  
55.8 (1998) 
40.5 (2010)  
60.3 (1998) 
Public debt 31% of GDP (2013 est.)  29.5% of GDP (2012 est.) 
50.4% of GDP (2013 est.)  
51.5% of GDP (2012 est.) 
 
Zinecker excludes the perpetuation of war violence, racism, ethnic segregation, 
poverty, and income inequality from factors causing violence in present-day Guatemala. 
Similarly, in the article “Criminal Violence and Democratization in Central America,” 
José Miguel Cruz explains, “Rather than internal war or poverty, one of the fundamental 
differences between the northern Central America and Nicaragua is the manner in which 
these states have dealt with public security and have responded to problems of violent 
crime.”60 In agreement with Zinecker and Cruz, this thesis challenges the notion of a 
direct causal relationship between history and violence or poverty and violence. Instead, 
it evaluates Guatemala’s democratic consolidation and institutional capacity through the 
judiciary and security sectors. In terms of Guatemala’s security, scholarly literature 
                                                
59 From “Index Mundi Country Comparisons–Guatemala and Nicaragua,” Index Mundi, accessed 
January 10, 2015, http://www.indexmundi.com/factbook/compare/guatemala.nicaragua. 
60 José Miguel Cruz, “Criminal Violence and Democratization in Central America: The Survival of the 
Violent State,” Latin American Politics and Society 53, no. 4 (2011): 7, doi:10.1111/j.1548-
2456.2011.00132.x. 
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addressing police issues is plentiful, while the study of civil-military relations is scarce. 
Thus, this thesis discusses police reform yet predominantly focuses on the study of civil-
military relations. 
Furthermore, this study evaluates the lack of social incentives—which results in 
social apathy—as a violence enabler. Guatemala’s social, political, and financial sectors 
have competing interests that impede the rebuilding of this nation. The rigid class system 
builds internal tension and does not allow for upward class mobility. Even though it has 
been 16 years since peace accords were signed, indigenous people, poor Ladinos 
(Guatemalans of Spanish descent), and the elite have not been able to coalesce. The state, 
however, has a direct relationship with Guatemala’s most influential circles. Elite-based 
political and institutional arrangements have been in place since Guatemala’s colonial 
times and follow a legacy of corruption, manipulation, and intimidation.61 Government 
carelessness toward stability and justice, as well as social apathy toward normalized 
violence, undermines democratic consolidation and security.  
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis is divided into five chapters. The first chapter offers a discussion on 
the importance of the research question, available literature, the hypothesis, and selection 
of arguments. The second chapter focuses on the historical background, including 
transitional justice and contemporary forms of violent crime in Guatemala. The third 
chapter provides an overview and assessment of Guatemala’s process toward democratic 
consolidation. The fourth chapter analyzes select arguments—weak institutional 
performance and social factors—to support the hypothesis. The final chapter summarizes 
findings, identifies implications for U.S. policy, and offers recommendations for decision 
makers.  
                                                
61 Morris Panner and Adriana Beltrán, “Crime in Guatemala–Fighting Organized Crime in 
Guatemala,” Quarterly Americas, Fall 2010, http://americasquarterly.org/node/1899. 
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II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
Before analyzing the causes of violence in Guatemala and to fully explore factors 
leading to the nation’s current security crisis, it is necessary to understand Guatemala’s 
political trajectory. From 1944 to the end of the civil war in 1996, Guatemala transitioned 
from a democracy to a military dictatorship and then back to a democracy. Some scholars 
argue that Guatemala’s contemporary crime problems are the result of a long history of 
social and political unrest. The civil war claimed the lives of thousands of Guatemalans, 
and truth commissions have linked periods of Guatemalan history to genocide. For 
example, in 1999 the Commission for Historical Clarification concluded that during the 
civil war, the state conducted repressive actions against selected groups within its 
population. The commission conclusively reported, “Agents of the state committed acts 
of genocide against groups of Mayan people.”62 Despite its best efforts toward 
reconstruction and reconciliation, Guatemala has not been able to achieve stability.  
In terms of security, Guatemala is far from efficient and sustainable and is often 
characterized as one of the most dangerous countries in the world.63 Government 
negligence, old grievances, widespread impunity, and modern crime create an 
environment that is not conducive for democratic consolidation, positive reform, or 
transformation.64  Common types of crime in contemporary Guatemala include homicide, 
drug trafficking, violent gangs, social cleansing, lynch law, femicide, and corruption. 
This chapter illustrates Guatemala’s arduous and unsuccessful trajectory toward justice, 
accountability, and social harmony. Furthermore, it identifies crime trends in more recent 
times. 
                                                
62 “Truth Commission: Guatemala,” United States Institute of Peace, accessed June 4, 2014, 
http://www.usip.org/publications/truth-commission-guatemala. 
63 Taft-Morales, Guatemala, 1. 
64 “Truth Commission.” 
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1. The Path to Civil War and Ensuing Conflict  
The 1940s and 1950s set the stage for the civil war of 1960 to 1996. Between 
1944 and 1953, Guatemala experienced a period of democratic reform centered on 
popular initiatives such as investment on education and agrarian law, which benefited 
thousands of poor citizens.65 These reforms greatly impacted the United Fruit Company 
and large landowners in Guatemala. Concerned with the possibility of the spread of 
Communism within the context of the Cold War and siding with American economic 
interests in the region, President Eisenhower allowed the Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA) to conduct covert operations. On December 9, 1953, Allen Dulles, director of the 
CIA, gave the approval for operation PBSUCESS—a covert scheme to overthrow 
President Jacobo Arbenz—and allocated a budget of $3 million for the program.66 With 
the support an opposition-led paramilitary, Operation PBSUCCESS met its objectives. 
Pressured and isolated, Arbenz resigned the presidency on June 27, 1954.67  
Carlos Castillo Armas, a former military officer in exile who was also recruited 
by the CIA, returned to Guatemala and assumed power.68 Armas immediately abandoned 
popular reforms established by the previous administration and implemented new laws 
that hindered the poor, such as revoking the right to vote for illiterate citizens.69 In the 
face of oppression and injustice, poor Guatemalans started to organize and pushback 
against the government, leading to the development of anti-government factions.70 In 
                                                
65 María José Calderón, “FRONTLINE–World Guatemala Timeline–PBS,” Timeline: Guatemala’s 
History of Violence, accessed November 2, 2014, 
http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/guatemala704/history/timeline.html#. 
66 “Memorandum: CIA’s Role in the Overthrow of Arbenz” (CIA Historical Review Program, May 
12, 1975), 5.   
67 Stephen Schlesinger et al., Bitter Fruit: The Story of the American Coup in Guatemala, Revised and 
Expanded, Revised edition (Cambridge, MA: David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies, 2006), 
199.  
68 Ibid., 214–15. 
69 Calderón, “FRONTLINE–World Guatemala Timeline–PBS.” 
70 Ibid. 
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1957, Armas was assassinated and General José Miguel Ramón Fuentes was elected 
president the following year.71 
The civil war started in 1960 when the government activated the military to 
address internal social unrest. As part of its military tactics, the regime also created 
alliances with right-wing militias to fight and eliminate the rebels. Ultimately, 
government-sponsored violence resulted in the torture and death of political opponents, 
including guerrilla fighters and Mayans. Civilian rule was briefly restored between 1966 
and 1969 with the election of civilian president Julio Cesar Mendez Montenegro. The 
violence, however, continued under this presidency as Montenegro made agreements 
with the military and pledged noninterference in the war against left-wing rebels in 
exchange for political support. In 1970, Colonel Carlos Arana Osorio was elected 
president and the violence against peasants and guerrilla fighters intensified.  
For the next 13 years, subsequent military presidents continued to sponsor right-
wing death squads. In March 1982, General Efrain Ríos Montt led a coup and took 
control of the country.72 This same year, the four predominant guerrilla groups—Partido 
Guatemalteco de Trabajo (PGT), Las Fuerzas Armadas Rebelde (FAR), La Organización 
del Pueblo en Armas (OPRA), and El Ejército Guerrillero de los Pobres (EGP)—unified 
into one group called La Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG).73 
Under General Ríos Montt’s dictatorship, Guatemala underwent the bloodiest period of 
the civil war. Some historians estimate 70,000 Guatemalans disappeared or were killed 
between March of 1982 and August of 1983.74 Thus, the Historical Clarification 
Commission (CEH) stated the following in its 1999 report:  
 
                                                
71 René Poitevin, ed., Compendio de Historia de Guatemala, 1944-2000, 1st ed (Guatemala: 
Asociación de Investigación y Estudios Sociales  : Konrad-Adenaur-Stiftung  : PNUD  : Fundación Soros, 
2004), 24. 
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The CEH concludes that agents of the State of Guatemala, within the 
framework of counterinsurgency operations carried out between 1981 and 
1983, committed acts of genocide against groups of Mayan people. . . .  In 
general, the State of Guatemala holds undeniable responsibility for human 
rights violations and infringements of international humanitarian law. The 
Chiefs of Staff for National [Defense] (Estado Mayor de la Defensa 
Nacional) was, within the Army, the highest authority responsible for 
these violations.75  
With the country in disarray, General Mejia Victores led a revolt and assumed power in 
August 1983.76 He facilitated the transition to civilian control with the election for a 
National Constituent Assembly (July 1984), the draft of a democratic constitution (May 
1985), and a democratic presidential election (November 1985).77 While democratic 
elections were critical for Guatemala’s transition from military authoritarianism, regime 
change was slow. For instance, newly elected civilian president Vinicio Cerezo Arévalo 
granted amnesty to military members and hindered the prosecution of officers for human 
rights violations. Jorge Serrano Elías assumed the presidency in 1991, but two years later 
he was removed from power because of his dictatorship style. Ramiro de Leon Carpio 
followed as president through legislative election.78 Peace talks between the government 
and the URNG began in 1994.79  
2. Cease-Fire  
In 1996, Guatemala’s long civil war finally ended with the signing of the final 
peace accord, known as the Agreement for a Firm and Lasting Peace (AFLP).80 Mediated 
by the United Nations, the agreement consolidated seven peace accords and three 
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operational agreements.81 The accords were organized into four areas of focus: civil 
control over the armed forces, protection of indigenous rights, socioeconomic reforms 
that protect the interests of rural populations, and institutional reforms to guarantee civil 
and human rights as well as the creation of the Commission on Historical Clarification.82 
In practice, however, the peace agreements did not substantially reduce the influence and 
power of the military and its political associates.83 For instance, two years after the 
signing of the accords, officials proposed a series of constitutional amendments to 
guarantee their implementation. After much discussion, on May 16, 1999, a national 
referendum was finally sent for congressional authorization. As it turns out, the 
referendum did not get enough votes, and the prescribed constitutional reforms never 
took place.84 The country has yet to see a comprehensive reform that guarantees stability 
and security as proposed in the accords.  
The civil war’s cease-fire took place without proclaimed winners or losers; no one 
took responsibility for the 36 years of civil war. While domestic and international efforts 
have been made toward state rehabilitation, transitional justice and reconciliation have 
not been solidified, and impunity and crime continue to be widespread. The fundamental 
challenges of Guatemala’s conflict, such as social divide, government-sponsored 
violence, and the demand for agrarian reform, have not been entirely resolved. 
3. Post-Civil War Crime and Violence 
Arguably, social and political wounds from the civil war along with weak 
institutions have perpetuated instability and enabled modern forms of violence. The 
evolution from civil war to post-conflict violence is palpable: during the civil war, the 
majority of victims of violence were indigenous people, while in post-conflict 
Guatemala, violence affects all sectors of the population. Meanwhile, underserved 
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communities continue to be common victims of crime.85 According to the Latin America 
Security and Defense Network’s (RESDAL’s) Public Security INDEX 2014 report, 
Guatemala is the second most violent nation in Central America after Honduras.86 
Conclusively, public security is Guatemala’s most critical problem.87 
In regard to Guatemala’s contemporary security crisis, the exponential increase in 
gang violence and drug trafficking in the past two decades has further eroded Guatemalan 
society and transnational security. As of 2011, almost one in four Guatemalans report 
being victims of crime, and only 24 percent of the population trusts government-provided 
security.88 With 5,000 homicides reported in 2012, Guatemala averaged 34 murders per 
100,000 people, ranking second highest in the Central America for homicides.89 In 
contrast, Costa Rica reported 407 homicides the same year, averaging less than nine per 
100,000 people.90 Guatemala’s unrelenting social discord, criminal activity, and 
corruption maintain the country’s vicious cycle of normalized violence, impunity, and 
resentment. The following sections provide an overview of Guatemala’s especially 
serious crimes and violence issues.  
a. Drug Trafficking  
Guatemala has become a key location for drug trafficking because it bridges 
South America to Mexico and the United States. In 2010, the U.S. Department of State 
estimated that “more than 60 percent of the cocaine passing through the Central 
American bridge states en route to the United States had transited Guatemala.”91 The 
infiltration of Mexican and Colombian drug lords in the country has increased 
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Guatemala’s drug problem exponentially. Mexican cartels have taken control of areas 
along the Guatemala−Mexico border and in the central city of Coban.92 In 2011, Carlos 
Castresana, former head of the UN’s International Commission against Impunity in 
Guatemala (CICIG), told U.S. diplomats that drug lords had effective control of almost 
60 percent of Guatemala’s territory.93  
Guatemala’s drug trafficking is an acute and complex problem. Narco-traffickers 
often recruit gang members to do dirty jobs and bribe officials across all echelons of 
government so they can operate freely and avoid prosecution.94 Frank Smyth, an 
investigative journalist, refers to Guatemala as an “untraceable narco-state” and points 
out that political figures, as well as high-ranking military officers, are deeply involved in 
drug networks, creating alliances and undermining the justice system.95 Julie M. Bunck 
and Michael R. Fowler explain that drug trafficking advances other illicit activities in 
Guatemala such as smuggling of arms, money laundering, kidnapping, stealing, and 
murder.96 
Drug traffickers have created power networks with intricate operational 
procedures that severely challenge law enforcement and security in Guatemala. For 
instance, drug lords have divided operational centers into smaller functional units often 
referred to as cartelitos or mini-cartels.97 In Bribes, Bullets, and Intimidation, Bunck and 
Fowler explain, “During the 1990s a number of cartelitos developed in Guatemala, each 
specializing in particular routes and methods and each with its own contacts with the 
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larger Colombian and Mexican organizations.”98 Today, these cartelitos have become 
sophisticated production and distribution centers connecting narco-trafficking operations 
among Guatemala, Colombia, Mexico, Honduras, and El Salvador.99 Of particular 
concern is the Guatemala−Honduras border, which the International Crisis Group calls 
the corridor of violence. Guatemala’s borders are not secured and are filled with illegal 
crossing points or puntos ciegos (blind spots).100  
b. Violent Gangs 
Violent gang affiliation has exponentially increased in recent years. In 2012, 
Guatemala had an estimated 22,000 gang members.101 The majority of individuals belong 
to one of two major competing gangs or maras—the 18th Street Gang (La Dieciocho) or 
the Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13)—although local gangs exist, such as the Breakeros, the 
Cholos, and the Latin Kings.102 Despite growing affiliation, violent gangs are a 
comparatively new phenomenon; until the end of the 1990s, violent gang activity was 
relatively low in Guatemala.103 In the past few years, however, gangs have become 
hierarchical and more organized. Today, gang activity is widespread and an increasing 
threat to Guatemala’s security. Often, voluntary affiliation is not an option; some 
members are born into broken families and gangs and cannot escape this vicious cycle.104 
Gang activity is mostly connected to drug-related crime, theft, possession of illegal 
weapons and, to a lesser extent, murder.105 In regard to gang-related homicide, Elin 
Ranum makes the following observation: “Other than in Guatemala City, homicide rates 
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are highest in areas where drug trafficking and organized crime take place, versus areas 
where gangs prevail.”106 Another point Ranum makes is that gang members are also 
victims of violence through social cleansing and from Guatemala’s repressive 
institutional system.107 Therefore, gang members are both victims and perpetrators. 
Maras are exceptionally violent and partially responsible for the rise of crime in 
Guatemala.108 The formation of violent gangs in Guatemala can be traced back to the 
United States as a result of massive deportation of illegal immigrants, which included 
gang members and unreported criminals, to Central America.109 Upon returning to their 
original countries, gang-deportees regrouped and expanded their networks and local 
membership. Gang members are predominantly males between the ages of 12 and 24.110 
They share identity, coded languages, and the idea of lifetime membership.111 Gang 
members often tattoo their bodies with gang signs as proof of allegiance.  
The growing gang presence challenges the strength of Guatemala’s public 
security system. Thomas Bruneau explains, “As there is an identified tendency for 
the [gangs] to resemble organized crime, at the level of national security they also may be 
considered a threat in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, which remain fragile 
democracies with relatively poorly articulated political institutions and tentative popular 
support.”112 Guatemala’s weak national security environment provides perfect conditions 
for the proliferation of violence and crime, thus intensifying the gang problem. 
c. Social Cleansing and Lynch Law 
Social cleansing is the systematic killing of “undesirable” persons, such as gang 
members and other criminals, by individual citizens within the community or by police 
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agents.113 Some in Guatemalan society believe that punishing perpetrators of crimes with 
extreme violence is more effective than relying on the governmental mechanism—
apprehension, trial, and conviction—for justice. Philip Alston, a UN special rapporteur, 
writes, “Indeed, given the failings of the [Guatemalan] criminal justice system, turning to 
on-the-spot executions of suspected criminals appears to some as the only available 
option.”114 The lack of trust in the security sector yields a state that cannot protect its 
people.  
Lynch law is another reported form of “insiders’ justice,” where groups, not 
individuals, conduct the killings. According to Alston, lynching has become a common 
practice in Guatemala.115 Caroline O. Moser and Cathy McIlwaine explain that since the 
1990s, lynching has become more frequent as a form of unofficial law enforcement.116 
Ranum agrees, “The overall environment of insecurity, a general lack of confidence in 
. . . the state, and in many cases the absence of the state, along with traditions of 
collective action, have led citizens to take justice in their own hands, including carrying 
out lynchings, a practice that is relatively frequent in Guatemala.”117 A report prepared 
for the office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights in Guatemala reported 43 
cases of lynching resulting in death from January to October of 2013—an increase of 
169 percent from previous years.  
d. Femicide  
Guatemalan indigenous women suffered sexual violence and indiscriminate 
murder during the civil war. Likewise, violence in contemporary Guatemala toward 
women—indigenous or otherwise—remains frequent and unpunished. Femicide, the 
systematic killing of women because of gender, is an epidemic with roots in Guatemala’s 
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conflict. Marilyn Thompson, a writer for the Latin America Bureau, explains, “During 
the civil war thousands of men in the military and paramilitary groups committed many 
acts of violence, including violence against women, and were subsequently reintegrated 
into society with no sanctions against them.”118 From this history, escalating violence 
against women is carried on today. In Guatemala, femicide is frequently linked to sexual 
abuse and occurs most commonly in rural areas. Arguably, femicide takes place among 
indigenous populations because the Mayan women are neither aware of their rights nor 
feel integrated into the justice system. According to a report by Deborah Hastings, a NY 
Daily News journalist, patriarchy plays a significant role in the occurrence of this 
problem.119 Ultimately, impunity is the predominant enabler of femicide. In 2012, 708 
cases of femicide were registered and investigated, but only 2 percent of the perpetrators 
were brought to justice.120 Figure 3 depicts the number of femicides reported by the 
Guatemalan police between 2007 and 2012.  
 
Figure 3.  Femicide in Guatemala 2007–2012121 
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Although these numbers have caught the attention of the international community, the 
Guatemalan government remains incapable of developing the necessary mechanisms to 
eradicate this problem. The Guatemala Human Rights Commission/USA attributes the 
high levels of femicide impunity to inadequate investigative processes, re-victimization, 
harassment, and institutional gender biases.122 
e. Corruption  
Corruption compromises the government of Guatemala and promotes impunity. 
Bunck and Fowler confirm, “Corruption has abounded and most government institutions 
have operated for many years in dismal fashion.”123 Greg Grandin, Deborah T. 
Lavenson, and Elizabeth Oslesby point out the existence of “hidden powers” tracing back 
to the civil war (1960–1996). These clandestine networks erode the security and justice 
systems and are composed of former and active military personnel with ties to organized 
crime.124 Additionally, Bunck and Fowler state that in Guatemala, criminals have been 
able to buy the support of police members and appointed officials.125 The fragility of the 
political system facilitates injustice and undermines democracy. In one poignant 
statement, Alston summarizes the current state of Guatemala’s security sector: “[It] is a 
good place to commit a murder because you will almost certainly get away with it.”126 
Lack of political will in implementing the rule of law and a lack of accountability 
contributes to the problem of security.127 
Guatemala’s leadership has been notoriously uncommitted, dysfunctional, and 
indifferent to reform. Over the years, its elite has included military generals, authoritarian 
leaders, and pseudo-democratic presidents. Most recently, a series of scandals and 
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corruption allegations have tainted the government. For instance in 2010, Conrado Reyes, 
the appointed public prosecutor, was removed from his post due to links with organized 
crime.128 In 2011, President Álvaro Colom’s sister-in-law was charged with fraud and 
money laundering.129 Furthermore, in an unsuccessful effort to bypass the constitution 
and run for presidential election, former first lady Sandra Torres divorced President 
Colom. The Constitutional Court dismissed Torres’s candidacy, but her actions show a 
serious attempt to manipulate the system from the highest echelons.130 Regarding the 
current administration, some analysts have linked President Otto Pérez Molina to possible 
human rights violations.131 Government carelessness toward justice and reconstruction as 
well as the lack of responsibility and accountability undermines democratic 
consolidation.  
4. Guatemala’s Legacy of Violence and Impunity  
Guatemala has made a few strides toward reconciliation with the past, but an 
analysis of its peacetime history demonstrates a regenerating cycle of security shortfalls. 
Abuse is generalized across all social groups, predominantly affecting underserved 
segments such as the indigenous population, poor Ladinos, and women. Furthermore, a 
weak judicial system exacerbates the problem. Guatemala’s legacy of violence and 
impunity is reflected in its contemporary challenges. A 2013 Department of State report 
on human rights highlights a range of critical security problems in Guatemala, including 
misconduct of and abuse from government officials, corruption, homicides, life-
threatening prison conditions, and abuse toward women and indigenous communities.132 
More recently, the consequences of high crime, violence, and impunity in 
Guatemala have become even more obvious: the illegal immigration of minors from 
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Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras into the United States has received unprecedented 
national attention. During a 2014 Senate oversight hearing, Congress “characterized this 
issue as a humanitarian crisis.”133 Guatemalan children risk their lives traveling through 
Mexico toward the United States, often as a result of concerned parents compelled to help 
their children escape poverty and violence in their native countries. For example, a child 
traveling from Guatemala to Rio Grande City in Texas would need to cover between 
2,000 and 2,500 kilometers in dangerous and unpredictable conditions.  
According to a report from the Wilson Center, as of August 2014, the U.S. border 
patrol has detained over 57,000 children, predominantly from Central America, illegally 
crossing the border.134 Table 5 illustrates the surge of unaccompanied alien children from 
Guatemala encountered at the U.S. border.  
Table 5.   Unaccompanied Alien Children Encountered Crossing  
the U.S. Border135  
Guatemalan Unaccompanied Alien Children Encountered by Fiscal Year (FY) 
Year FY2009 FY2010 FY2011 FY2012 FY2013 FY2014 
Guatemala 1,115 1,517 1,565 3,835 8,068 17,057 
 
The United States defines an unaccompanied alien child (UAC) as “an immigrant 
who is under the age of 18 and not in the care of a parent or legal guardian at the time of 
entry, who is left unaccompanied after entry, and who does not have a family member or 
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legal guardian willing or able to care for them in the arrival country.”136 The causes for 
the exponential increase in illegal crossings in fiscal years (FYs) 2013 and 2014 are 
politically controversial and debatable; nevertheless, this complex problem is arguably 
related to the rise in crime and violence in contemporary Guatemala.137  
Chapter II discussed Guatemala’s historical background ranging from the 
democratic experiment of the mid-1940s to the change in regime, the civil war and the 
subsequent cease-fire. Furthermore, it examined critical forms of violent crime in 
Guatemala’s present-day society. Having established the historical and contextual 
settings, Chapter III evaluates the quality of Guatemala’s democracy as the framework 
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III. DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION 
This thesis contends that the causes of post-conflict violence in Guatemala are a 
combination of weak institutional capacity and a lack of social factors. In pursuing these 
arguments, this chapter focuses on Guatemala’s democratic system as an enabling 
structure for institutional deficiencies and social apathy. This approach is largely based 
on the notion that the quality of democracy is directly related to security. Classic 
democratic theory emphasizes the regime’s role in providing security and fostering public 
order; as such, weak states are less effective in combating crime. In their book, 
Criminality, Public Security, and the Challenge to Democracy in Latin America, Marcelo 
Bergman and Laurence Whitehead validate this point: “Since the state is key for the 
development of credible, rule of law-based crime fighting institutions, countries with 
strong state traditions have tended to address the [crime] challenge much better than 
weak states.”138 As Guatemala does not provide minimum standards of security and 
public order, one might argue it is a weak democratic state; the government has not been 
able to effectively combat modern crime.  
After 36 years of civil war and strong militarization, Guatemala emerged as a new 
democracy in 1996. Thus, the transition from authoritarian to democratic government is 
relatively new.139 Democratization started in 1984 with the first presidential election that 
brought Arévalo to power in 1985. Nevertheless, the process was full of fallacies and 
military favors while the civil wars continued. The 1996 Peace Accords facilitated by the 
UN came into effect and changed the course of Guatemala’s political history. Critical 
junctures in Guatemala’s path to democratization are illustrated in Table 6. 
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Table 6.   Guatemala’s Path to Democratization140 
The Road to Liberal Democracy in Guatemala 
Preceding 













In Democracy in Latin America, Peter H. Smith reasons that the longevity of the 
system can be an indicator of democratic consolidation.141 Modern democracy in 
Guatemala is less than 20 years old. Nevertheless, a permanent electoral process has been 
established to elect a president as well as 158 members of the unicameral congress, 333 
mayors, and 20 members of the Central American Parliament every four years.142  
Elections are fundamentally fair and free in Guatemala, but political violence 
regularly penetrates the system. In the latest election cycle, for example, electoral 
observers described instances of corruption and intimidation.143 Likewise, the 2014 
Bertelsmann Stiftung report for Guatemala states that over 40 politically affiliated 
individuals were killed during the campaign season.144 While the new regime introduced 
the basic principles of civil rights and security to Guatemala, crime and violence continue 
to be widespread. To a large extent, modern forms of violent crime replaced state-
sponsored violence. As mentioned earlier, security and the rule of law are fundamental 
public goods in any democratic state. In this regard, Guatemala falls short. The definition 
of democracy and further analysis of the current state of affairs in Guatemala’s 
democratic system is discussed in the following sections.  
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1. Defining Democracy 
Democracy is a government system in which the people choose their leaders. 
Scholars have defined and classified the spectrum of democratic systems in numerous 
ways. Nevertheless, some fundamental foundations hold true for all democratic regimes: 
elections, security, protection of human rights, equality, justice, and the rule of law.145  
The late Robert A. Dahl, a distinguished political science scholar from Yale 
University, offers one of the most recognizable definitions of democracy based on his 
concept of procedural democracy.146 According to Dahl, seven minimal conditions must 
be met in a democracy: 
1. Practically all adults can vote. 
2. Practically all adults can run for office. 
3. Elections are free and fair. 
4. All adults are free to choose political affiliation. 
5. All adults are fee to practice political expression. 
6. Political sources of information are available and protected by law. 
7. Elected officials are constitutionally protected to make decisions. 147 
Dahl’s polyarchy offers the fundamental principles that make democracy possible.  
Phillipe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl suggest two additional conditions. 
First, elected officials must be able to act without reprisal from other actors such as 
military officers, civil servants, or any unelected official. Second, the domestic political 
institution, or polity, must be free from pressure or influences from outsiders.148  Thus, 
the system must be self-governing. Furthermore, Schmitter and Karl define modern 
political democracy as systems in which citizens, facilitated by competition among and 
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cooperation between elected officials, hold those in office accountable for their public 
and political activities.149  
In defining and studying the various stages or forms of democracy, Smith offers 
the concept of liberal democracy, that is, “electoral democracies with expansive civil 
liberties.”150 Adding to the scholarly discussion, Fareed Zakaria presents a sliding scale 
for illiberal democracies in which political systems reside somewhere between 
dictatorships and consolidated democracies.151 Illiberal democracies, Zakaria explains, 
are democratically elected regimes that ignore constitutional boundaries and do not 
provide their citizenry with basic civil rights and freedom.152 He warns that illiberal 
democracies hinder true democratic governance because they appear to be functional 
systems, but they are not.153 Comparably, Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way define 
competitive authoritarian regimes as systems that appear to be democracies due to the 
existence of formal institutions—electoral, legislative, and judicial systems plus the 
media—yet fail to allow fair competition. Thus, these governments appear to be 
democracies but are not because the political opposition has no tangible power.  
In the evolution of democratic systems, democratic consolidation is the desired 
end state. Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan offer a framework of the necessary conditions 
for democratic consolidation based on constitutional strength, social participation, and 
political attitudes and behaviors.154 Within this approach, Linz and Stepan define a 
consolidated democracy as “a political regime in which democracy as a complex system 
of institutions, rules, and patterned incentives and disincentives has become, in a phrase, 
‘the only game in town.’”155 In other words, only a well-established democracy—
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implying no danger for democratic breakdown exists—can be considered a consolidated 
democracy. 
Defining democracy is a complex task in which generalizations do not account for 
the various stages and nuances of democratic systems around the world. Nevertheless, 
one must appreciate theoretical frameworks and their applicability for evaluating and 
measuring the quality democratic systems. Furthermore, assessing the strength and 
weakness of democratic systems can reveal crucial fallacies and identify paths for 
progress. 
Drawing from David Collier and Steven Levitsky’s article, “Democracy ‘with 
Adjectives,’” Andreas Schedler devises a graphical depiction of regime families—
authoritarian regimes, electoral democracies, liberal democracies, and advanced 
democracies—to illustrate the conceptual progression of democratic consolidation (see 
Figure 4).156 In this approach, electoral and liberal regimes both avoid regression toward 
authoritarianism and seek to improve the quality of the democratic system. The 
difference among regimes is based on progression toward consolidation. Electoral 
democracies have free and fair elections, but lack political and civil freedom. Liberal 
democracies not only foster stable election systems, but also guarantee civil, political, 
and human rights to their citizens. Advanced democracies, in turn, exceed and deepen the 
aforementioned democratic standards. In this context, Schedler’s model defines five 
stages of democratic development.157 
First, preventing democratic breakdown is the stage in which the state’s transition 
out of an authoritarian regime has given way to an electoral or liberal democracy. 
Nevertheless, anti-system actors and possible military coups continue to threaten the 
democratic regime. As such, leaders become more preoccupied with securing democracy 
than institutionalizing it. If breakdown takes place in this stage, it will most likely be a 
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sudden and dramatic change.158 Second, preventing democratic erosion indicates the 
process of fortifying liberal democracy while identifying and avoiding less obvious 
threats, such as incremental loss of civilian control and decay of constitutionalism. In this 
stage, the possible degradation of the regime is gradual and less transparent than in the 
previous stage.159 Third, completing democracy refers to a stage where the electoral 
process functions well and the government is moving in the right direction, but some 
critical elements of the democratic structure are still deficient. These shortfalls often 
reflect authoritarian legacies in the form of inadequate constitutional laws, hegemonic 
political parties, and selective and biased rule of law.160 Fourth, in deepening democracy, 
leaders are less preoccupied with survival and more interested in the quality of 
democracy. Here the overall governmental and institutional performance is satisfactory 
but still has room for improvement.161 In the last stage, organizing democracy, the 
system reinforces institutional capacity and democratically advances in areas such as 
leadership and institutional performance, quality of the judicial system, and protection of 
civil and human rights.162 
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Figure 4.  Concepts of Democratic Consolidation163 
2. Measuring Democratic Consolidation in Guatemala 
No standardized procedures or universal formulas exist to measure democracy. 
Nevertheless, various frameworks provide norms and criteria to evaluate democracy both 
qualitatively and quantitatively. This section describes Guatemala’s performance 
according to the 2013 Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) Democracy Index and the 2014 
Freedom House assessment. Furthermore, this thesis presents an independent assessment 
of the current state of democracy in Guatemala based on Schedler’s concepts of 
democratic consolidation. 
The EIU Index measures democracy on a scale from zero to 10, evaluating 
countries scoring below 4 as authoritarian regimes, those between 4 and 5.9 as hybrid 
democracies, those between 6 and 7.9 as flawed democracies, and those between 8 and 
                                                
163 From Schedler, "What Is Democratic Consolidation?," 152. 
 42 
10 as full democracies.164 Variations in the electoral process and pluralism, government 
performance, political participation, democratic political culture, and civil liberties are 
taken into consideration in assigning a score to a country. 
As such, the EIU Democracy Report for 2013 classifies Guatemala as a flawed 
democracy. This rating corresponds with Guatemala’s score of 6.07, which barely 
qualifies for the flawed democracy category (see Figure 5). Additionally, Guatemala 
scored 8.75 in electoral process and pluralism, 6.79 in functioning of government, 4.38 in 
political culture, and 2.78 in political participation. The EIU defines flawed democracies 
as regimes that, despite having free and fair elections, display concerning elements such 
as weak governance, political culture, and participation in their platforms.165 
 
Figure 5.  EIU Democracy Index Scale and Guatemala’s Placement166 
Similarly, Freedom House conducts yearly assessments of democracy and 
freedom, classifying countries as free, partly free, or not free. It evaluates eight variables: 
the electoral process, political pluralism and participation, functioning of government, 
freedom of expression, associational and organizational rights, rule of law, personal 
autonomy, and individual rights.167 
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In 2014, Freedom House rated Guatemala as partly free. Overall, the country 
received 3.5 out of 7 possible points, with lowest scores in the functioning of government 
(5/12 points) and rule of law (6/16 points) categories. Despite improvements in the 
overall democratic process, Freedom House continues to identify intimidation, 
corruption, and low institutional capacity as major problems for Guatemala.168 For 
instance, in 2013, the administration closed the organization responsible for promoting 
peace projects at the municipal level, the National Fund for Peace (FONAZ), because of 
pervasive corruption. The Social Development Fund was created in its place, but 
Freedom House reports the new organization is also “plagued by corruption.”169 Freedom 
House also states that during judicial proceedings, witnesses and legal staff are constantly 
under threat.170 In December 2012, for example, seven individuals with ties to the 
judicial system were killed in the town of Huehuetenango.171 
3. Assessment  
Using Schedler’s approach, the analysis of Guatemala’s path to democratic 
consolidation indicates the country is a completing democracy (see Figure 6). In other 
words, Guatemala is an electoral democracy moving toward liberal democracy. As 
Schedler points out, most Latin American countries fall under the completing democracy 
classification because of constitutional legacies of authoritarian regimes, biased rule of 
law, and a need for state reform.172  
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Figure 6.  Concepts of Democratic Consolidation (XG = Guatemala)173 
As mentioned earlier, Guatemala’s electoral system is well established but lacks 
some essential features of liberal democracies. Some might argue that Guatemala is in 
fact preventing democratic erosion, particularly after President Molina assumed power. 
Since his election, repression and domestic militarization has increased, along with social 
polarization. For instance, during anti-mining demonstrations in 2012, Molina favored 
mano dura tactics, using military force against protesters.174 Despite such setbacks, due 
to the level of intervention from global players in the 1990s and current regime vigilance 
from international observers, Guatemala will not likely regress to an authoritarian regime.  
Constitutional defects, as Schedler explains, are common in completing 
democracies, particularly in post-authoritarian electoral democracies that allow the 
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departing regime to influence constitutional law.175 Schedler refers to this political 
dilemma as “constitutional legacies of military regimes.”176 As such, Guatemala’s 
constitution is not completely free from its authoritarian past; it was written in 1985 and 
amended in 1993, before the completion of the peace accords in 1996. The peace process 
promised Guatemala’s transition to a more secure and inclusive democratic state. 
Nevertheless, key measures such as the national referendum of 1999, which proposed 
critical constitutional reforms directly related to the peace accords, never passed the 
congress.177 Another constitutional flaw is that, unlike consolidated democracies, 
Guatemala’s constitution requires a uniformed officer to hold the position of minister of 
defense, blurring the lines of civil control over the military.178  
Schedler’s regime configuration for completing democracies also includes the 
existence of selective and biased rule of law.179 Guatemala has experienced its fair share 
in this area. For example, in 2012, the CICIG accused 18 judges of using their positions 
to enable impunity by ruling in favor of criminals and dishonest politicians.180 The case 
went to the Supreme Court, but by the end of 2013, only a handful of judges had testified 
during the investigation; it is not clear if any of them have been prosecuted.181 In another 
example, the penal system concealed the existence of “VIP” prisoners. In 2013, 
Guatemala’s minister of government disclosed that a group of selected inmates—
including the notorious Captain Byron Lima who was incarcerated for the 1998 murder 
of Bishop Juan Jose Gerardi—in addition to other benefits, were allowed to leave jail at 
leisure. This finding created outrage among Guatemalans but most likely did not 
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eliminate this practice; extensive extortion networks still exist inside Guatemala’s prison 
system.182 
Regardless of how one might label Guatemala’s democratic system—whether a 
flawed democracy, partly free, or a completing democracy—in the path for democratic 
consolidation, the state still has a great deal of improvements to make. Guatemala’s 
government must perform more effectively and design stronger accountability and self-
enforcing mechanisms. Institutional reforms and updated legislation are also paramount. 
In Comparative Peace Processes in Latin America, Dinorah Azpuru highlights the 
importance of systematic changes for democratic consolidation in Guatemala: 
Regarding democratization, the [peace] accords provide for improvements 
in the justice system, the national police, Congress, the office of the Public 
Prosecutor, and other key institution. . . . The accords provide for . . . 
important changes in the structure and role of the army. Implementation of 
these changes for the political and institutional system may help 
consolidate democracy in Guatemala.183 
As Guatemala completes democratization, it must focus on strengthening institutional 
capacity to improve citizen security. As such, the next chapter examines the judicial 
system, the reform of the national police, civil control over the armed forces, and social 
participation.  
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IV. INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY AND SOCIAL FACTORS  
Having established that Guatemala is not a consolidated democracy, this chapter 
analyzes the nation’s most fundamental security institutions as well as social factors 
related to the high incidence of violent crime. This work reveals that while democratic 
institutional weaknesses have direct and cumulative effects on violence, social factors 
influence—but do not determine—security levels. On one hand, the inadequacies of the 
judiciary, the national police, and the civil control over the military are palpable. On the 
other hand, social factors are difficult to measure and demonstrate wide variations across 
communities. Even though this thesis concludes that social factors are not chief reasons 
for violent crime, they still play a role in influencing violence, and policymakers should 
consider their effects on this issue. 
A. JUDICIAL SYSTEM  
The judicial system is one of the pillars of a democratic system, and it is crucial 
for the protection of citizens. In The Spirit of Democracy, Larry Diamond explains,  "A 
democratic rule of law requires a judiciary that is, at every level, neutral, independent 
from political influence, and reasonably competent and resourceful."184 The following 
section discusses the organization of Guatemala's judicial system and evaluates its 
capacity to employ the rule of law and foster justice. But first, considering Guatemala's 
arduous path to democratization, it is relevant to understand the country's efforts toward 
transitional justice and reconciliation.  
1. Transitional Justice and Reconciliation 
Transitional justice and reconciliation are ongoing processes in Guatemala. 
Therefore, it is helpful to define such concepts. Various scholars explain the meaning of 
transitional justice, but the most commonly used definition comes from the International 
Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ):  
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Transitional justice is a response to systematic or widespread violations of 
human rights. It seeks recognition for the victims and to promote 
possibilities for peace, reconciliation, and democracy. Transitional justice 
is not a special form of justice, but justice adapted to societies 
transforming themselves after a period of pervasive human rights abuse. In 
some cases, these transformations happen suddenly; in others, they may 
take place over many decades.185 
Thus, by this definition, transitional justice is fundamental for Guatemala. 
Equally important, reconciliation targets the necessary post-conflict conditions to 
repair social grievances and promote understanding among wrongdoers, ex-combatants, 
and victims. These essential elements include accountability, security, closure, and 
individual empowerment.186 Helen Mack, a leading human rights activist in Guatemala, 
argues that reconciliation has different meanings to different individuals. The idea of 
"look[ing] forward to the future, not back at the past," might be the definition of 
reconciliation for the guerrilla and military members involved in the civil war.187 
Nevertheless, for many victims of genocide, reconciliation means bringing perpetrators to 
justice.188 As such, for the past two decades, a number of justice and accountability 
initiatives have taken place in Guatemala, which the following paragraphs illustrate. 
First, in an effort to seek reconciliation in post-conflict Guatemala, the UN 
established a truth commission in the early stages of reconstruction. After two years of 
investigations, the commission’s final report concluded that genocide had indeed 
occurred and that the state's oppressive institutions included the military and the judicial 
system. Based on agreements between the government and the rebels, the commission 
was not allowed to place responsibility. Nevertheless, it made recommendations for 
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reparations such as state reform, financial remuneration for the indigenous people, and 
construction of memorials.189 
Second, the creation of the UN's CICIG has positively influenced the 
effectiveness of the Supreme Court. Established in 2007, the CICIG works in full 
partnership with Guatemala's government, and, unlike the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ), it does not replace the Guatemalan judicial system. The commission's main 
responsibilities include policy and reform recommendations to the state and expert 
support for the investigation and prosecution of illegal security forces and clandestine 
security organizations (CIACS).190 Prior to the CICIG, arresting corrupt government 
officials was extremely difficult due to political pressures and retaliation. Nevertheless, 
with the help of this commission, the Supreme Court has found a moderate sense of 
political independence compared to previous years.191 
Third, the UN established the Transitional Justice Program (PAJUST) in 2010 to 
support and strengthen the country's fight against impunity. The program focuses on 
human rights, seeking investigatory transparency, justice, and social healing.192 One of 
its major contributions has been the conviction of two police officers for crimes 
committed during the civil war; the evidence used in the trial was found in the Historic 
Archives of the National Police, which PAJUST funds.193 
Finally, the 2010 appointment of Claudia Paz y Paz as attorney general advanced 
the pursuit of justice across all spectrums of Guatemalan society. During her four years in 
office, the justice system experienced unprecedented improvements as she diligently 
pushed for the prosecution of war crimes and favored transparency in highly politicized 
cases.194 Despite efforts to transform the judicial system, criticism and pushback against 
                                                
189 “Truth Commission.” 
190 Sixth Report, 3. 
191 BTI 2012, 3. 
192 Strengthening the Rule of Law in Crisis-Affected and Fragile Situations (United Nations 
Development Programme, 2012), 21, 
http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/crisis%20prevention/ROLAR2012SEPT.pdf. 
193 Doyle, “The Pursuit of Justice in Guatemala.” 
194 BTI 2012, 12. 
 50 
institutional reforms have continued to pour in from the elite. To the astonishment of 
human rights activists and the international community at large, Paz y Paz was not 
considered as a nominee for attorney general in 2014, despite her impeccable record. 
Instead, the current administration appointed Thelma Aldana, a lawyer who apparently 
favors amnesty for military officers involved in the genocide.195 The pervasiveness and 
influence of unethical and powerful groups has become a significant obstacle in the 
process of justice and reconciliation.196 
2. Description of the Judiciary  
The judiciary is an independent branch of the government. Decree 2-89 of the 
Guatemalan congress stipulates that the judiciary has sovereign power, given by the 
people, to enforce the law according to the constitution.197 The Supreme Court and the 
Constitutional Court are Guatemala's highest justice intuitions.198 The Supreme Court 
oversees the major justice system and is structured into three high court chambers: civil, 
criminal, and protection/anti-trial (amparo/antejuicio)—the last of which deals with 
constitutional law and matters of immunity for public officials.199 The Supreme Court 
also adjudicates governmental issues. For instance, under the current administration, the 
Supreme Court has handled disputes over education and tax reform.200 The congress 
appoints the 13 members of the Supreme Court, the 43 court of appeals judges, the 
attorney general, and the public prosecutor.201 
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At the lower levels, the judicial system is organized into specialized courts. The 
peace courts address small claims; the first instance courts are the first line of justice for 
civil disputes and criminal trials; and the courts of appeals hear first-time pleas.202 Other 
courts addressing special matters include the child and adolescent courts, the continuous 
administrative tribunal, and the appellate court of accounts.203 One to three judges 
preside over these courts, but in some instances, a mayor might fulfill the role of judge at 
smaller municipalities.204 Lastly, military courts preside over crimes committed by 
uniformed members, and the civilian system has limited information on those cases.205 
In addition to the CICIG, three other independent organs serve advisory roles in 
the protection of state, civil, and human rights: the Offices of the Public Prosecutor, the 
Attorney General, and the Human Rights Ombudsman. Decree 40-94 of congress 
specifies the duties of the public prosecutor, who predominantly has an auxiliary role to 
the judicial system. The public prosecutor, however, has the authority to carry out, 
discontinue, or waive legal proceedings based on discretionary findings.206 Additionally, 
the attorney general is the head of the Public Ministry and the state's legal representative, 
assisting and advising the court system and the government.207 The duties and 
responsibilities of this position are specified in decree 512 of congress.208 Finally, the 
ombudsman investigates possible human rights violations and fosters the improvement of 
policies and measures in this area.209 The ombudsman is also part of the Congressional 
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Committee on Human Rights and is responsible for drafting public reports and providing 
advice to policymakers.210  
3. Assessment 
While the judiciary has demonstrated some progress in the past few years, it 
continues to be an inadequate system. Guatemala has increased the number of high-
profile prosecutions involving government officials, most notably between 2009 and 
2012 during which time conviction rates doubled.211 The CICIG has made significant 
contributions to the judicial system, particularly by working jointly with the Office of the 
Public Prosecutor.212 According to CICIG's last report, the prosecution of murder cases 
increased by 23 percent between 2009 and 2012.213 Despite its support of the 
Guatemalan justice system, the CICIG is scheduled to terminate its mandate in 
September 2015, and President Molina has not approved an extension.214 
Accountability within the judiciary is a key problem for Guatemala. Even though 
the Public Ministry is responsible to provide oversight, measures continue to be 
insufficient; most commonly, corruption and intimidation severely damage the system. 
Bunck and Fowler explain, "Prosecutors have been especially weak, the courts especially 
corruptible, and the tradition of elite impunity especially strong. These flaws plainly 
contributed to the grave difficulties Guatemala has experienced."215 Systematic 
roadblocks within the judiciary contribute to the proliferation of crime and impunity. 
Homicide rates continue to be high while prosecution remains low. A Human Rights 
Watch report on Guatemala states that only 2 percent of criminal cases were solved and 
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the perpetrators brought to justice in 2013.216 At 70 percent, Freedom House's reported 
impunity rates for the same year are more conservative, nevertheless still alarming. 
The repertoire of problems within the judiciary is vast. The constitution calls for 
an independent judicial branch; nevertheless, political pressure is frequently placed on the 
judiciary.217 Elite circles, including groups of public officials such as lawyers' 
associations, often influence the appointment of judges and other decision-making 
mechanisms.218 Judges can stay in place for 20 years, but sometimes they have to comply 
with or compromise according to external interests groups in order to hold their posts.219 
Thus, complacency and legal inertia become an issue.220 The 2014 Bertelsmann 
Stiftung’s Transformation Index reports, "With this influence ranging from extensive 
corruption to small bribes, the chain of justice is weak."221 Prosecution of corruption 
cases within the judiciary rarely takes place, even when the media and other civil 
organizations denounce the lack of justice.222 Other salient problems include lack of 
resources and low professionalization of juridical staff.223  
Arguably, the criminal trial of retired general and former president José Efraín 
Ríos Montt is the prime example of the judiciary's inadequacies. Between 1982 and 1983, 
he led an aggressive campaign, called Beans and Bullets, against the insurgency, which 
resulted in the torture and deaths of thousands of peasants.224 Former Attorney General 
Paz y Paz became a key figure during the proceedings, diligently ensuring the case 
moved forward despite political pressure. On May 10, 2013, the Guatemalan justice 
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system convicted Ríos Montt of genocide and sentenced him to 80 years in prison. The 
sentence was considered a victory for genocide victims, human rights observers, and 
international activists.225 But the victory was short-lived; within two weeks, the 
Constitutional Court overturned the verdict under a legal technicality.226 Former military 
and business owners allegedly involved in the civil war embraced the dismissal of the 
final ruling.227 Furthermore, after the initial conviction and with the support of the 
current president, the main prosecutor was dismissed from participating in any further 
hearings related to the case.228 Ríos Montt was placed under house arrest and a new trial 
was scheduled for 2015.229 
On January 5, 2015, the new trial started, only to be suspended shortly after it 
began. After the judge denied the defense's claim that Ríos Montt's was too sick to stand 
trial, the layers brought the former general into the courtroom on a medical bed. The 
defense team quickly found another way to stop the trial; since the principal judge in the 
case had written a college thesis on genocide, the team claimed the trial would not be fair 
and unbiased.230 This time, the tactics worked, and the trial was postponed. On January 
13, 2015, Ríos Montt did not appear for a court hearing, blaming poor health. As a result, 
the court ordered him to undergo a medical evaluation and legal proceedings were halted 
once again.231 Ríos Montt's case demonstrates that the weight of political influence is 
alive and well in the Guatemalan judicial system.  
This evaluation indicates that although Guatemala's judiciary has made moderate 
improvements since the peace accords, it clearly lacks institutional capacity. The rule of 
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law is not equally enforced among Guatemala's citizens, and often members of the elites 
enjoy undeserving privileges. The system is plagued with corruption and clientelism 
while accountability mechanisms are inadequate. Promising improvement efforts such as 
the CICIG and the prosecution of war crime perpetrators have lost momentum. The 
judicial system has stagnated and runs the risk of institutional erosion. Impunity 
undermines citizen security. Conclusively, the ineffectiveness of the judiciary promotes a 
self-reinforcing system of violent crime and impunity.  
B. POLICE REFORM  
Considering Guatemala's overlapping spheres of interest and intricate political 
and social dynamics, conceptualizing police reform for this nation proves rather complex. 
Nevertheless, police reform is relevant for Guatemala because it offers a tangible 
measure of crime reduction and containment. While it might be natural to assume that 
police reform in Guatemala will result in improved security, reform must also take place 
in the larger institutional systems that support the police force, such as the previously 
mentioned judicial system. The following sections define the term police reform and 
provide an overview of the PNC structure and related obstacles for Guatemala. 
1. Understanding Police Reform 
The main function of the police force is to serve its national community, enforce 
the law, ensure the safety of all citizens, and protect human rights.232 When law 
enforcement fails to deliver results, the idea of police reform becomes a practical 
solution. Nevertheless, the topic of police reform is loosely defined among scholars, 
widely discussed among leaders, and poorly implemented in Latin America. For some, 
police reform means reorganizing the entire police structure; for others, it means 
increasing funding, training, and capability. Yet for scholars like Mark Ungar, it is part of 
a larger dimension that includes legal, political, and social dynamics.  
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Conceptually, police reform means making the police force more effective and 
efficient within democratic parameters to improve security. In a consolidated democracy, 
institutions have a complementary relationship, and the police force is an essential 
element of the democratic system. Therefore, police reform is not possible without a 
collaborative environment that supports change: an efficient government, properly 
designed laws, effective accountability processes, a working legal system, and a willing 
police force. When these elements are weak or missing, police performance is critically 
compromised.  
2. Description of the National Police  
The peace accords of 1996 initiated Guatemala's police reform with the signing of 
the Agreement on the Strengthening of Civilian Power and on the Role of the Armed 
Forces in a Democratic Society.233 The National Commission for National Civil Police 
Reform oversaw the initial steps toward reorganization. The government dissolved the 
Military Police, restructured the National Police and the Guardia de Hacienda, and 
created one integrated system, the National Civil Police (PNC).234 In 2010, Government 
Agreement 361-2010 authorized the creation of the National Commission on Police 
Reform.235 As such, the president appoints the head of the commission, who is 
responsible for providing police reform oversight and recommendations to 
policymakers.236 Some key issues addressed by this organization include police 
efficiency, adequate criminal investigations, professionalization, and accountability.237 
The PNC falls under the authority of the Ministry of Interior. Nevertheless, the 
Ministry of Defense, the Office of the Public Prosecutor, and the Office of the Human 
Rights Ombudsman also have roles in the security system, such as oversight and 
protection of human rights.238 The Minister of the Interior appoints the PNC's director 
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general.239 The police force's primary mission is to protect the life and property of all 
citizens and to combat crime.240 The PNC has eight sub-directorates: operations, criminal 
investigations; personnel; logistics and support; crime prevention; counternarcotic 
information analysis; studies and doctrine; and communications and information 
technology.241 The PNC's Office of Professional Responsibility conducts internal 
investigations.242 In 2012, the administration authorized the creation of special task 
forces to combat serious forms of crime such as homicide, femicide, and kidnapping.243  
As of 2012, the PNC had 26,201 members, approximately 0.6 percent of the 
population.244 Police officers operate across six regional headquarters with 27 primary 
police stations, 127 posts, and 343 substations.245 Admission to the police force requires 
meeting a selection board and is open to males and females between the ages of 18 and 
30 with secondary education completed, no police records, and no tattoos.246 The sub-
directorate of studies and doctrine oversees the training and education of police officers 
at the National Civil Police Academy, the Police Officer Training School, the School of 
Superior Studies, and the Police School for Specialization.247 Career ascension ranges 
from basic level to directorate. Table 7 depicts the various ranks within each level of the 
PNC's career path. 
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Table 7.   PNC Career Progression248 
Police Career 
Basic Level Mid-Level Senior Level Directorate 
Agent G3 Officer Deputy Commissioner 
Deputy Director 
General 
Deputy Inspector G2 Officer Commissioner Director General 
Inspector G1 Officer General Commissioner  
 
The 2013 PNC's budget was in the vicinity of $382 million.249 It accounts for 
48 percent of the security budget and approximately 1.5 percent of Guatemala's gross 
domestic product (GDP).250 From 2012 to 2013, the PNC budget experienced an increase 
of approximately 10 percent. Figure 7 illustrates the evolution of the PNC budget over 
seven years.  
 
Figure 7.  Guatemala's PNC Budget Progression251 
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An inextricable link exists between security and police force capacities.252 Police 
performance is problematic; while incentives are low, corruption and abuse are high. 
According to Freedom House, over 1,500 complaints of police abuse were reported to 
authorities in 2013 alone.253 A recent study empirically measuring the efficiency of the 
National Police reported low police performance in 18 of 22 Guatemalan provinces.254 
Consequently, citizens commonly dislike, distrust, and fear the police force. In 2013, for 
instance, only 24 percent of the population expressed trust in the police.255 Overall, 
Guatemala demonstrates five primary challenges for police reform.  
First, the very structure and organizational culture of the Guatemalan police force 
is an obstacle to reform. The lack of incentives for police performance—such as low 
wages, slow career ascension, inadequate training, and ill-defined operational 
procedures—leads to reduced commitment and low morale.256 For instance, in 2013, 
members of the police force complained of reform stagnation and threatened to go on 
strike if salaries were not increased and work conditions did not improve.257 Other 
problems affecting police reform include poor allocation of resources, the lack of a 
centralized command and control, and resistance to change.258 The police are 
understaffed; Guatemala employs approximately 173 police officers per 100,000 
habitants, but the UN recommends 222 officers for the same number of residents.259 
Even though budget allocation for security has increased in the past few years, the Public 
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Ministry has ineffectively managed resources, resulting in limited overall improvements 
to the police force.260  
A weak political sphere is another obstacle to police reform. To gain support for 
elections, for example, politicians tend to use reactionary measures such as military force 
and mano dura policies.261 Mano dura, or heavy hand, uses violent repressive force 
against crime, often leading to human rights violations and murder. This aggressive tactic 
undermines due process, resulting in the overuse of violence toward criminals and 
innocent citizens alike. For instance, Guatemala's Plan Escoba, or Operation Broom, 
allowed police officers to apprehend suspected criminals, such as gang members, without 
due process.262 Ranum explains how the operation worked between 2003 and 2004: 
“This crackdown strategy consisted merely of the massive and indiscriminate detention 
of thousands of youths suspected, sometimes rightly and often wrongly, to have some 
relations to gangs."263 In Guatemala, reactionary approaches might appear to reduce 
crime, but ultimately, they result in limited deterrence.264 Deviation from professional 
ethics can range from small infractions to government officials’ participating in 
organized crime. Police officers have been rightfully accused of stopping vehicles, 
demanding bribes, and stealing private property.265  
Third, legal and judicial systems are essential elements of law and order, but in 
Guatemala these institutions enable poor police performance. Inadequate procedures and 
vague laws facilitate police abuse and prevent effective responses to crime. For instance, 
in 2012 the Office of the Public Prosecutor dismissed over one third of the complaints 
received against the police.266 The Department of State's Guatemala 2013 Human Rights 
Report states, "Police impunity for criminal activities continued to be a serious 
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problem. . . .  The PNC routinely transferred officers suspected of wrongdoing rather than 
investigating and punishing them."267 Legal authorities can exercise a great amount of 
personal discretion, including dismissal of cases, arbitrary detention, delayed 
investigations, and faulty trials.268 The penitentiary system also shows serious problems. 
As of early 2015, the system had over 18,000 inmates in facilities with capacity to house 
6,500 inmates; over 47 percent of these detainees are still awaiting trial.269  
Fourth, the police lack institutionalized mechanisms for accountability. Internal 
inadequacies and poor accountability undermine the entire police force. The PNC's 
Office of Professional Investigations (ORP) is responsible for internal investigations 
whenever police officers are implicated. In 2013, the ORP received hundreds of 
complaints against police officers, but no data is available on the outcome of these 
cases.270 Corruption and misconduct are major problems within the police ranks, 
exacerbated by the lack of accountability.271 Therefore, improvements to police 
accountability require a systematic approach. Mariana Mota Prado, Michael Trebilcock, 
and Patrick Hartfold explain, "[Police] reformers should promote accountability, starting 
with the most basic mechanisms . . . moving to more complex ones only when the basic 
ones are in place."272 In Guatemala, however, the police structure is unable to universally 
enforce appropriate rules, rewards, and sections, which are fundamental for institutional 
accountability.273 
The CICIG, however, has served as an accountability mechanism across 
numerous Guatemalan public institutions to include the PNC. As such, the CICIG has 
successfully investigated and prosecuted a number of police officers linked to criminal 
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networks.274 One such case was the conviction of former PNC chief of criminal 
investigations Victor Hugo Soto Dieguez and two accomplices for killing 10 inmates 
between 2005 and 2006.275 On August 8, 2013, Soto was sentenced to 33 years in prison 
while his collaborators each received 25 years.276 Despite its positive contributions to 
police accountability, the CICIG has been losing momentum within Guatemalan 
establishments due to lack of support and funding from the current administration.  
Fifth, privatization of security is becoming all-pervasive. Elite Guatemalans are 
finding ways to provide security for themselves in the form of gated communities and 
personal bodyguards. In Guatemala, hiring private security is common whenever 
affordable. In 2013, an estimated 280 private security firms—of which only 140 were 
registered—employed 51,000 guards nationwide.277 Despite being common and widely 
available, this type of security service is loosely regulated and just about anyone, 
properly trained or otherwise, can fill security guard positions.278 Furthermore, private 
security undermines the legitimacy of the state and, as Ungar proposes, questions "the 
government's ability to fulfill one of its most fundamental tasks."279 
The immediate assumption is that the role of the police is to provide security. 
Nevertheless, Guatemala’s PNC has been unable to fulfill its mission. Its force is poorly 
trained and too small for the number of Guatemalan citizens; resources are mismanaged; 
internal accountability structures are weak. For this reason, the concept of police reform 
is widely debated. Police reform is a term loosely defined yet very important. 
Theoretically, it means improving security. Yet police reform has shown little progress in 
creating the mechanisms necessary for preventing and combating violent crime in 
Guatemalan communities.   
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C. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN GUATEMALA  
Civil-military relations focus on the distribution of power between a 
democratically elected government and the armed forces.280 As such, the subordination 
of the military to civil authorities is a key characteristic of consolidated democratic 
systems. This crucial relationship influences society and, as witnessed through history, is 
powerful enough to solidify or threaten the political direction of states. Glen Segell and 
Dhirendra K. Vajpeyi explain the importance of this topic:  
The study of civil-military relations shows that military institutions are 
microcosms of the societies that create them. As such the armed forces are 
also fundamental in shaping society while society is fundamental in 
shaping the armed forces; soldiers are also residents and citizens with 
family in the society of the country that they serve.281 
The concept of civil control over the military has been widely investigated. For instance, 
to evaluate civil-military control, scholars have and continue to adapt Alfred Stepan's 
military prerogatives. Now, Thomas Bruneau and Cristiana Matei's contemporary 
paradigm introduces the analysis of effectiveness as an essential tool in the study of civil-
military relations and democratic consolidation.282 Therefore, a thorough understanding 
of civil-military relations becomes particularly important for new democracies such as 
Guatemala. Considering the extent of repression and violence incited by the armed forces 
during the military regime and the current levels of violent crime in modern Guatemala, 
the process of demilitarization and reform of the armed forces, as well as the 
strengthening of security, has been crucial to this society. 
As part of the peace process and in the context of civil-military relations, the 
United Nations facilitated the 1996 Agreement on the Strengthening of Civilian Power 
and the Role of the Armed Forces in a Democratic Society.283 The agreement directed a 
series of constitutional and military reforms to ensure civil control over the armed forces. 
                                                
280 Peréz, “The Transformation of Civil-Military Relations,” 2013, xi. 
281 Ibid., 9. 
282 Cristiana Matei, “Developing Effective Armed Forces in the Twenty First Century Case Studies of 
New Democracies,” Journal of Defense Resources Management 2, no. 1 (2011): 23. 
283 Zoltan Barany, The Soldier and the Changing State: Building Democratic Armies in Africa, Asia, 
Europe, and the Americas (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012), 171. 
 64 
More specifically, it demanded the restriction of the military to external defense, the 
elimination of anti-guerilla units, and the reduction of scope and funding for the military 
defense system.284 As a result, the security sector reorganized, the military police 
disintegrated, and the Ministry of the Interior created the PNC; meanwhile, the military 
remained under the control of the Ministry of Defense (MOD).285  
Guatemala's defense system is a vertically organized institution with seven major 
echelons. The democratically elected civilian president is the general commander of the 
army and controls the MOD.286 The National Security Council advises the president, and 
its members include the vice president, the secretary of strategic intelligence of the state, 
the attorney general, and the ministers of foreign affairs, government, and defense.287 
The National Defense Staff, whose Joint Military Staff also advises the president, falls 
under the MOD. The army, navy, and air force, also subordinate to the MOD, are the next 
three echelons.288 Figure 8 depicts the defense system's chain of command. Congress's 
National Defense Committee (not depicted) oversees the entire defense system.289  
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Figure 8.  Guatemala's Defense System Organization290 
As of 2014, the Guatemalan armed forces had 22,326 members, approximately 
0.14 percent of the population.291 Up to 18 months of military service is mandatory for 
males; in practice, however, most members are volunteers.292 Women are allowed to 
serve and account for 6 percent of the total military force.293 There are approximately 
2,600 officers, all of whom must be native Guatemalan citizens without any other foreign 
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Table 8.   Armed Forces Strength295 
Guatemala's Total Military Force (2014): 22,326 
Army Navy Air Force Citizen Security (Part of the Army) 
15,568 1,666 1,008 4,084 
Officers Enlisted Officers Enlisted Officers Enlisted Officers Soldiers 
1,990 13,578 224 1,442 180 828 207 3,877 
Man Man Man Man 
1,824 12,721 212 1,377 177 733 207 3,707 
Women Women Women Women 
166 857 12 65 3 95 0 170 
 
The organization of the Guatemalan defense structure provides a reference for the 
scope and strength of the military. Next, this thesis examines two frameworks for the 
analysis of civil-military relations: Stepan's military prerogatives and Bruneau and 
Matei's concept of democratic control and military effectiveness.  
1. Civil-Military Relations Based on Military Prerogatives 
Stepan offers a theoretical framework that measures military privileges and 
influence within a democratic state. This model evaluates 11 military prerogatives rated 
as low, medium, or high.296 Inherently, these military prerogatives are inversely 
proportional to civil-military control; in other words, the lower the rating of the 
prerogatives, the higher the civilian control over the military. This model proves to be 
useful in examining the strength of civil-military relations. Bruneau and Scott D. 
Tollefson explain, "A central element of the democratic deepening is the diminishment of 
the military prerogatives."297 In Civil-Military Relations in Developing Countries, 
Orlando J. Pérez evaluates Stepan's framework in regard to Guatemala's current state of 
affairs.298 Table 9 illustrates Pérez's findings.  
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Table 9.   Assessment of Guatemala's Military Prerogatives299 
Alfred Stepan's Framework 
on Military Prerogatives Guatemala Assessment 
1. Constitutionally sanctioned 
independent role for the 
military in the political system 
Medium Some role in the political system 
2. Military relations with the 
chief executive Low 
Chief executive is both the 
jure and de facto commander 
in chief of the armed forces 
3. Coordination of defense 
sector High 
Performed almost exclusively 
by uniformed military 
commanders within each 
branch of the armed forces 
with little to no coordination 
by civilians 
4. Active duty military 
participation in the cabinet Medium 
A few, exclusively focused on 
military affairs 
5. Role of legislature High 
No oversight function. Merely 
rubber stamps decisions made 
by the military of the chief 
executive 
6. Role of senior career civil 
servants or civilian political 
appointees 
High 
Active duty military officials 
fill most, if not all, defense 
sector positions 
7. Role in intelligence High 
Intelligence agencies 
controlled by uniformed 
military officers, combining 
intelligence gathering and 
operational matters 
8. Role in police Low Police under civilian control 
9. Role in military promotions Medium Combination of civil and military control 
10. Role in state enterprises Medium 
Retired military officers may 
serve as head of state 
enterprises. Rarely do active 
duty members serve in that 
capacity 
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Pérez rates nine of 11 prerogatives as medium or high, indicating that Guatemala's 
military is still a powerful and influential institution. Expanding from Stepan's 
framework, Pérez also examines the strength of civil-military relations through four 
crucial factors: constitutional and legal arrangements; nature and organization of the 
military; role of the military; and allocation of resources.300 He concludes, "There is no 
doubt that democratic consolidation of civil-military relations has not fully occurred in 
[Guatemala]."301 Although Stepan's model is helpful and widely used in accessing civil-
military relations, the examination of military prerogatives alone does not address all 
dimensions of these complex relationships. For this reason, Bruneau and Matei developed 
a framework that analyzes the effectiveness of the security system. 
2. A New Framework of Analysis 
In the context of civil-military relations, Bruneau and Matei argue that much 
emphasis is given to the concept of military control and not enough to its effectiveness. 
Bruneau assertively proposes, "Civil-military relations should be conceptualized not only 
in terms of democratic civilian control but also for effectiveness in implementing a 
spectrum of roles and missions."302 Bruneau and Matei contend that measuring control 
alone is not a sufficient condition for solidifying civil-military relations; therefore, they 
include the evaluation of military effectiveness in their conceptualized model.303 This 
new framework is divided into six minimum requirements under the dimensions of 
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Table 10.   Requirements for Consolidated Civil-Military Relations304 
First dimension: 
Democratic control  
Second dimension: 
Effectiveness (goals and missions) 
1. Institutional capacity for controlling the 
armed forces 
1. A plan or strategy that indicates what is 
intended to be achieved and how to achieve it 
2. Oversight to see that civilian direction is 
being followed 
2. Central institutions to implement the 
strategy 
3. Professional military education to modify 
the culture of an armed force in line with a 
civilian-led, democratic orientation 
3. Sufficient resources, both financial and 
human, to ensure implementation 
 
Bruneau and Matei's framework offers a relevant, contemporary perspective on the status 
of Guatemala's civil-military relations. Next, this thesis uses this framework to make an 
assessment of civil-military control in Guatemala. 
a. Democratic Control of the Armed Forces in Guatemala 
The evaluation of democratic control of the military includes an analysis of 
institutional capacity, oversight, and professional military education (PME). 
(1) Institutional Capacity 
Institutional control mechanisms are necessary to direct and regulate the defense 
sector according to the democratic principles of civil control of the military.305 Various 
elements contribute to the analysis of institutional capacity, including the legal 
framework, strength of the MOD, and civilian control of intelligence.306   
A well-established legal basis for civil-military relations is paramount in 
determining institutional capacity. The Guatemalan constitution legitimizes the power of 
the president, the congress, and the armed forces. Sections 182, 183, and 246 of the 
constitution stipulate that the president is the general commander of the army with the 
power to give orders through the MOD, including the mobilization or demobilization of 
military personnel.307 Section 171 gives the congress the power to declare war and sign 
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peace treaties.308 Article 244 categorically defines the military as the protector of internal 
and external security. It is relevant to note that in 1999, political reforms did not succeed 
in removing the military's constitutional responsibility for internal security; therefore, the 
participation of the military in domestic affairs is constitutionally sound.309 Even though 
Guatemala has implemented a legal framework for its civil-military relations, the 
constitutional power of the military, particularly concerning internal affairs, continues to 
be ill-defined.310   
Evaluating the strength and legitimacy of the MOD is also crucial because this 
institution directs the defense structure based on government goals. Since its creation in 
1945, the MOD has been restructured to incorporate the departments of strategic analysis 
and human rights.311 Current legislation (DL Nº 72-90–1990/12/13, Sec. 15 and 17) 
stipulates that under the control of an elected civilian president, the MOD is responsible 
for managing and overseeing the armed forces.312 Accordingly, it implements policy and 
coordinates defense matters with other state intuitions.313 The Guatemalan constitution 
does not allow civilians to hold the office of minister of defense. It stipulates, "The 
President of the Republic is the Commander General of the Army and will convey his (or 
her) orders through the general officer or colonel or its equivalent in the Navy, who holds 
the position of Minister of National Defense."314 Therefore, only military officers can be 
appointed for this position.315 Since the peace accords, Guatemala has had 15 ministers 
of defense hold the position for approximately 14 months each.316  
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For the most part, the MOD is staffed with military officers. A 2004 analysis of 
civil-military relations in Guatemala indicated that only one senior civil advisor served 
under the ministry, and "no professional cadre of career civil servants or civilian political 
appointees assisted the minister of national defense in designing or implementing defense 
and national security policy."317 The predominance of military personnel in Guatemala's 
MOD is perceived as a blemish in its civil-military relations. Pérez illustrates the 
concern: "In Western democracies and in Latin American countries with a more 
advanced civilian control of defense, [the ministries of defense] are under the command 
of a civilian minister and contain a large number of civilians in key positions for the 
formulation and implementation of the defense policy."318 Clearly, Guatemala does not 
comply with this norm of consolidated democracies; consequently, the armed forces 
enjoy a great degree of institutional autonomy.319  
Control of intelligence is also part of institutional capacity. As Matei explains, 
"Intelligence is part of the civil-military realm."320 For many countries, intelligence falls 
under the department of defense and is often the first line of defense during a crisis.321 In 
Guatemala, civilian control over intelligence is particularly important because military 
intelligence units were often involved in human rights violations during the military 
regime. In terms of organization, The Secretaria de Inteligencia Estrategica del Estado, 
or the National Secretary of Strategic Intelligence, acquires and processes strategic 
intelligence for the protection of the country and advises the president and the National 
Security Council on intelligence matters.322 Its military counterpart falls under the MOD. 
In 2008, Guatemala passed a National Security Strategy law that calls for "the 
creation of a Legislative Commission on Matters of Intelligence and National Security 
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which establishes judicial and citizen control on issues of security and intelligence."323 
As a result, the National Security System was established to address the need for stronger 
oversight on intelligence and security.324 Nevertheless, civil control of intelligence 
matters continues to be deficient while military presence in this field is widespread. In 
this context, Pérez rates the current role of the military in intelligence matters as high, 
indicating that the military has a significant level of control over intelligence. He bases 
this assessment in the fact that institutions such the Secretariat for Strategic Analysis 
(SAE) and the Security Advisory Council (CAS), which were created to advise the 
president in intelligence matters, are generally staffed with active duty and retired 
military officers.325  
(2) Oversight 
Through the National Defense Committee, the congress has the constitutional 
power to provide oversight to the defense system.326 Nevertheless, the legislative power 
for civilian oversight is limited and compromises the effectiveness of the National 
Defense Committee.327 Pérez provides an example: "The power of the military in relation 
to the congress on defense issues is broad. Under the pretext of maintaining State secrets, 
congressional oversight of the defense budget is limited and its ability to exercise 
authority over defense policy is minimal."328 Article 30 of the Guatemalan constitution 
guarantees the public distribution of administrative information, but it protects the 
secrecy of the military and the diplomatic community if the information at hand is 
considered critical for national security.329 
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Oversight of the Guatemalan armed forces has been legitimized, but it is far from 
perfect. On one hand, the 1996 peace accords suppressed the political influence of the 
military, an action that contributed to the civil prosecution of military members for 
human rights violations.330 On the other hand, the defense structure is not free of 
corruption, including the use of bribes and extortion among the ranks. Furthermore, 
former military officers often hold important civilian government positions, facilitating 
the spread of interest-driven coalitions that undermine the democratic process and 
challenge civil control over the military.331  
(3) Professional Military Education  
PME shapes military culture and is, therefore, crucial for democracies 
transitioning out of military authoritarianism. Bruneau states, "If countries in Latin 
America want to reform their national defense and security structures . . . they also must 
reform PME."332 Section XII of Guatemala's Book of National Defense outlines the 
education and professionalization of the military.333 The process of PME has three 
phases: vocational training, officers' training, and advanced professional education. 
Vocational training is comparable to a high-school program and is offered at one of seven 
Adolf V. Hall Institutes. In essence, these centers provide civic-military education and 
professionalization for teenagers. Upon graduation, these young adults receive the rank of 
reserve lieutenant and have the opportunity to continue their studies at military academies 
or civilian universities.334 As an army institution, the Polytechnic School produces the 
majority of officers and is responsible for the basic training of all services jointly. Other 
military schools include the School for Military Aviation (EMA), the Technical School 
for Military Aviation (ETMA), the Naval School of Guatemala (ENG), the School of 
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Communications and Computer Science, and the Military School of Music.335 Even 
though the academies offer international exchange programs, no Guatemalan officers had 
the opportunity to study abroad in 2013.336 
Similar to the U.S. system, professional military training in Guatemala is 
incremental.  For career progression, officers must complete the basic military, advanced 
weapons, and command and staff courses. Advanced professional education for officers 
takes place at the Center for Advanced Studies of National Defense complemented with 
the Naval School and the Military Aviation School for officers of the navy and the air 
force respectively.337  
Officers also have the option to earn a master's degree in Resources and 
Technology Administration. Technical training for enlisted personnel is also progressive, 
and civilian education is encouraged to complement and advance professionalization.338 
A number of civilian colleges offer courses in defense, such as the Foundation for the 
Institutional Development of Guatemala (ESTNA).339 Overall, Guatemala has 
accomplished significant PME reforms, which include coed education and joint training 
through military schools and civilian institutions. 
b. Effectiveness in Achieving Goals and Missions 
The evaluation of military effectiveness includes an analysis of strategy, central 
institutions, and availability and allocation of resources. 
(1) Strategy 
Two documents institutionalize defense policy in Guatemala: the Libro de la 
Defensa Nacional de la República de Guatemala 2003, which is essentially its White 
Book, and the Policy for Defensa Nacional 2005, or the National Defense Policy 2005.340 
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Guatemala's white book is divided in five parts, defining doctrine and the roles and 
missions of armed forces and the state. It also outlines policy, democratic controls, 
defense structure, military education and professionalization, as well resource 
allocation.341 The National Defense Policy is divided into eight chapters, including 
strategic interests, the legal framework, and international participation.342 Although 
Guatemala's defense strategy has been refined and updated, some guidelines present 
deficiencies. For instance, the national policy directing democratic controls over the 
military is superficial and lacks specific measures for tracking strategic goals.343 
(2) Institutions: Roles, Missions, and Interoperability  
The roles and missions of the Guatemalan armed forces include national defense, 
disaster relief, protection of natural resources, and internal order.344 Sections 244 and 249 
of the constitution define the general mission of the military as follows: 
The Guatemalan [armed forces] is an institution devoted to maintaining 
the independence, sovereignty and honor of Guatemala, the integrity of its 
territory, peace and internal and external security. It is composed of land, 
air and maritime forces. It has a hierarchical organization and is based on 
the principles of discipline and obedience. The Army shall cooperate in 
emergency or public disaster situations.345  
The constitution also describes the military as "unique and indivisible, essentially 
professional, apolitical, obedient and non deliberant."346 Additionally, each service of the 
armed forces—army, navy, and air force—has a specific mission.347 During times of 
peace, the army performs domestic and international activities related to education, 
readiness, peacekeeping, and humanitarian operations.348 Because of Guatemala's 
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vulnerability to earthquakes, hurricanes, flooding, and mudslides, the military also plays 
a key role in disaster relief. Civilian authorities lead emergency aid operations, while the 
military contributes with trained personnel and equipment.349 Moreover, Guatemala's 
defense strategy also includes the protection of natural resources. For this purpose, it has 
integrated two main programs: The Environmental Protection of the Maya Biosphere in 
Izabal, and the formation of green battalions for environmental protection in Petén.350  
Three main factors drive the relationship between the armed forces and the public 
security sector. First, the constitution allows the military to address internal security 
challenges. Second, as mentioned earlier, the PNC are a notoriously weak institution and 
have not been able to contain domestic violence. Third, the proliferation of violent crime, 
particularly organized crime, has encouraged the use of the military to combat this 
problem.351 Therefore, the defense sector is also tasked with participating in "citizen 
security, prevention and repression activities in border areas, actions against organized 
crime and drug trafficking, and perimeter control in penitentiary centers."352 To reinforce 
the PNC, the military has assigned over 1,500 reservists to three Citizen Security 
Squadrons in charge of providing security to selected municipalities.353  
The role of the military in domestic security is controversial and concerning to 
some human rights groups.354 Due to the reprehensible violent actions of the military 
during the civil war, the peace accords emphasized the need to limit military participation 
in internal issues. Almost two decades later, the government still has not been able to 
strengthen the police force to effectively combat crime, and thus continues to use the 
military as a viable alternative to domestic security. In fact, soon after assuming the 
presidency, President Molina made the following remark, "I want to lay out for the army 
an important goal of collaborating, coordinating and cooperating with other security 
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institutions, and that is to put an end to the external threats and contribute to neutralizing 
illegal armed groups by means of military power."355 Political observers have criticized 
President Molina's emphasis in using military operations to address internal issues, 
particularly because he is a retired military officer who served during the civil war.356 
The militarization of public security undermines democratic principles, 
particularly in a nation with a history of military authoritarianism. Pérez explains, "[In] 
aiding the police, the missions are ill-defined, short-term, and are constructed in the 
absence of effective crime prevention policies. Thus they expose the armed forces to ad 
hoc activities that may affect their operational capabilities and undermine the objective of 
military control."357 Despite receiving political support, military intervention has earned 
a less-than-desirable record in the past few years. For instance, during an indigenous 
rights protest in 2012, soldiers fired toward a crowd of activists, resulting in six deaths 
and numerous injuries. After much internal debate and denial of responsibility, a number 
of soldiers were tried for this incident.358 Internal security is an acute problem in 
Guatemala, and the country's leadership has failed to clearly define the extent of military 
intervention permissible in domestic affairs.359 
(3) Resources  
At the end of the civil war, Guatemala's defense budget was approximately 
$234 million, and its force was composed of over 45,000 members.360 After the peace 
accords, the size and budget of the military decreased substantially. By 2010, the defense 
budget was $159 million and the force strength was a little under 15,000 members.361 
Today, the military has regained some of its strength; the 2014 defense budget was 
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approximately $258 million, and the current force has over 22,000 members.362 Figure 9 
illustrates the evolution of the defense budget from 2006 to 2014.  
 
Figure 9.  Guatemala's Defense Budget Progression363 
The 2014 defense budget accounts for 0.44 percent of the GDP.364 For this same 
year, approximately 56 percent of the budget was allocated to personnel, 13.2 percent 
toward investments including property and equipment, and the rest was distributed 
among other non-categorical expenses.365 The small percentage of GDP dedicated to 
defense, considering that more than half of this sum goes to personnel, indicates 
Guatemala does not allocate enough resources to implement an effective strategy that 
includes both internal and external defense roles. 
3. Assessment and Summary of Findings 
Building on Stepan's military prerogatives to analyze Guatemala civil-military 
relations, Pérez concludes that civil control over the military has improved, but 
"compared to the ideal of democratic civilian-military relations much remains to be 
done."366 Similarly, based on Bruneau and Matei's conceptualized framework of civil-
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military relations, this thesis also concludes that Guatemala has deficient civilian control 
of the military as well as a moderately inefficient defense system. Table 11 offers a 
summary of findings. 
Table 11.   Summary of Findings Based on Bruneau and Matei's 
Conceptualized Framework367 
Requirements for achieving democratic civilian control and effectiveness: Guatemala 
















Regarding democratic requirements for civilian control, Guatemala receives a 
mixed evaluation. On one hand, the constitution provides the legal basis for control and 
institutional capacity, but its nuances facilitate a high degree of military autonomy and 
curb the ability of civilian oversight. For instance, the current legislation only allows for a 
member of the military to assume the position of minister of defense.368 Furthermore, 
under the pretext of national security, the military has the legal right to withhold 
information from civilian authorities. Therefore, institutional capacity and oversight 
receive lower ratings. On the other hand, PME rated higher as it has been positively 
reformed and includes coed and joint education from basic training to advanced 
instruction.  
In terms of effectiveness, civil-military control in Guatemala has made low to 
moderate progress. The country has a white book for strategy, but it lacks depth and 
guidance on specific measures to track goals. The roles and missions of the defense 
system as a whole and as individual services are well defined and call for an "apolitical, 
obedient, and non-deliberative" force.369 Yet, the multipurpose role of the military, 
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particularly at the domestic level, continues to be controversial and ill-defined. Finally, 
despite an increased defense budget in the past few years, Guatemala does not allocate 
enough resources to effectively maintain its defense strategy.  
Since the end of the civil war in Guatemala, military reform has significantly 
improved civil-military relations. Nevertheless, the defense system remains powerful and 
unchecked. The government’s over-reliance on the armed forces in dealing with internal 
security threats compromises democratic consolidation and undermines citizen security. 
D. SOCIAL FACTORS  
Thus far, Chapter IV has focused on institutional weakness as the cause of violent 
crime in Guatemala. Nevertheless, social factors—such as compromised family 
structures, citizen support of violence, and lack of social capital—also influence chronic 
violence. This argument benchmarks the works of Tani Marilena Adams as well as 
Caroline O. N. Moser and Cathy McIlwaine. These scholars examine the complex social 
forces that encourage violence: Adams defines the concept of chronic violence while 
Moser and McIlwaine categorize violence as political, economic, and social.370 As such, 
this thesis argues that while institutional weakness contributes to the rise of economic 
violence, interpersonal factors enable social violence. This section offers a description of 
the problems that Adams, Moser and McIlwaine put forward. It also discusses pertinent 
theoretical frameworks and assesses the social factors associated with Guatemala's 
violent crime. The section ends with an alternative argument for the violent crime 
problem. 
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1. Theoretical Overview 
Adams argues that cycles of chronic violence are the result of complex structural 
elements, negative behaviors, cultures, and actions that obstruct human development.371 
She explains, "When we live in 'chronic violence,' parents are unable to nurture their 
children adequately; social relations become more restricted, polarized and conflictive; 
and our role as citizens or participants in the larger community suffers—as do the social 
support and the prospects for democratic governance."372 Adams defines chronic 
violence as a high level of violent occurrences sustained for at least five years, affecting 
more than one social sphere—ranging from the nuclear family to larger groups such as 
schools and neighborhoods.373 Chronic violence, therefore, results from the relationship 
between deficient institutional and social processes and individuals.374 It hinders the 
development of individuals at the physical, mental, and social levels as well as their 
ability to socialize and positively participate in the civic domain.375 In this context, 
individuals become willing participants in the self-perpetuating process of chronic 
violence. 
To frame violence and social contexts, Adams offers the following research 
questions: "What happens to human beings when [violence] becomes our 'normal' 
everyday life to live with high levels of violence? How does it affect our development as 
individuals, how we raise our children and relate to others in society, our attitudes and 
actions as citizens, and the ways we are governed?"376 Adams conceptualizes chronic 
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violence as the byproduct of deficient macro-level structures and weakened social 
factors.377 Essentially, Adams identifies the organic association between citizens and 
their micro and macro environments and how these relationships prevent or foster 
violence. Thus, she proposes the development of a social system that enables individuals 
to thrive within their communities, naturally eliminating the need for them to resort to 
violence.378 Matthew C. Ingram and Karise M. Kurtis agree with Adam's framework and 
suggest that understanding such social interactions can assist policymakers in devising 
appropriate responses to contain and decrease violent crime.379  
Moser and McIlwaine categorize critical violence into three spheres and posit that 
violence is motivated by political, social, and economic gain (see Table 12).  
Table 12.   General Categories of Violence380 
Categories of Violence 
Category Definition Manifestation 
Political 
The commission of violent 
acts motivated by desire, 
conscious or unconscious, to 
obtain or maintain political 
power. 
Guerrilla conflict; paramilitary 
conflict between political 
assassinations; armed conflict 
between political parties; rape 
and sexual abuse as a political 
act. 
Economic 
The commission of violent 
acts motivated by desire, 
conscious or unconscious, for 
the economic gain or to obtain 
or maintain economic power. 
Street crime; carjacking; 
kidnapping; assaults including 
killing and rape made during 
economic crimes. 
Social 
The commission of violent 
acts motivated by a desire, 
conscious or unconscious, for 
social gain or to obtain or 
maintain power. 
Interpersonal violence such as 
spouse and child abuse; sexual 
assault of women and 
children; arguments that get 
out of control. 
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Moser and McIlwaine contend that in Guatemala, economic and social violence is more 
prevalent than political violence.381 Arguably, political stakeholders are the main 
perpetrators of political violence, but as established in Chapter I, they are no longer the 
primary cause of violence.382 Therefore, like Moser and McIlwaine, this thesis maintains 
that social factors have a role in economic and social violence and that political violence 
is not as common.   
Moser and McIlwaine explore the concept of social capital as a key social factor. 
They define social capital as the "rules, norms, obligations, reciprocity, and trust 
embedded in social relations, social structures, and societies' institutional arrangements, 
that enable its members to achieve their individual and community objectives."383 
Respectively, Cecilie Dinesen et al. further define social capital into structural and 
cognitive: structural social capital depends on community-based connections and social 
participation while cognitive social capital embodies standards of behavior and values 
among individuals.384 These concepts are useful for understanding the relationship 
between societal factors and violence.  
A number of scholars associate high levels of violent crime with social 
disorganization. Robert Bursik and Harold G. Grasmick hypothesize a directly 
proportional relationship between unorganized communities and violent crime. Building 
on this theory, Bursik and Grasmick suggest that social factors, such as population 
density and broken family structures, influence this relationship.385 Similarly, Kenneth C. 
Land, Patricia L. McCall, and Lawrence E. Cohen recognize population pressures and 
family disruption in their conceptualized framework. As such, they measure population 
pressures in terms of concentration and demographics and family disruption in terms of 
divorce rates and single-parent households.386 Arguably, broken family structures 
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compromise "informal social controls" within communities while high population density 
areas hinder the development of social bonds and social participation.387 
This social context has been empirically linked to violence. A report from the 
Wilson Center highlights that a number of studies associate domestic violence with 
"broader societal violence."388 For example, Joy D. Osofsky explains that it is not 
uncommon for children who experience domestic violence to perceive violence as an 
acceptable way to resolve conflict or to control others.389 Consequently, violence 
becomes a part of life for individuals, groups, and entire communities. The impact of 
normalized violence is clear in the elevated levels of domestic violence, gang 
membership, social cleansing, and femicide in Guatemala. To this extent, Eguizábal et al. 
report, "Elevated rates of domestic abuse, sexual violence, and weak family and 
household structures also contribute as children are forced to fend for themselves and 
often chose (or are coerced into) the relative 'safety' of the gang or criminal group."390 
Similarly, in Murder and Violence in Modern Latin America, Eric A. Johnson et al. 
conclude that marginalized families who struggle to provide the most essential needs, 
such as shelter and food, often neglect crucial family values and bonds.391 The result of 
such inadequacies is often reflected in violence at the individual and group levels.  
2. Assessment  
Three fundamental social factors influence violent crime in Guatemala: 
compromised family structures, citizen support of violence, and lack of social capital. 
First, intra-family violence is pervasive in Guatemala, a significant factor for the 
perpetuation of social violence.392 Between 1999 and 2000, Moser and McIlwaine 
conducted fieldwork research in Guatemala using a participatory appraisal method. They 
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concluded that domestic violence is "routinized" across Guatemala's society to a degree 
in which individuals accept it as a way of life.393 Domestic violence appears normalized 
in the family nucleus as well as in the society at large. Consequently, intra-family 
violence and femicide are "inextricably linked in Guatemala."394 In 2014, Guatemala's 
Institute for National Statistics published a detailed report on intra-family violence, which 
clearly indicates that women are the main victims of domestic violence, although men 
can be victims too (see Tables 13 and 14). 
Table 13.   Occurrences of Intra-Family Violence—Female395 
Female Victims of Intra-Family Violence in Guatemala 
2010 2011 2012 2013 
29,158 30,578 33,140 32,918 
Table 14.   Occurrences of Intra-Family Violence—Male 396 
Male Victims of Intra-Family Violence in Guatemala 
2010 2011 2012 2013 
2,858 2,906 2,967 3,252 
  
Based on these figures, women are 10 times more likely to suffer a domestic 
attack than men. According to a report by the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, 
approximately 24 percent of all femicides in Guatemala were the result of intra-family 
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violence in 2011.397 Conclusively, social norms related to gender contribute to domestic 
violence and perpetuate violent crime inside and outside households. Furthermore, 
members of dysfunctional or broken families are more likely to commit violent crimes 
than their counterparts from more stable families. For instance, a 2006 survey identified 
family-related issues as the number one factor influencing gang affiliation in 
Guatemala.398 Finally, as previously mentioned, domestic violence has become 
normalized in segments of Guatemalan society. For example, most police officers view 
domestic violence as a "private matter" rather than a serious problem.399 Furthermore, 
Guatemalans find it difficult to acknowledge domestic violence, as they consider it a 
taboo subject.400  
Second, social support for violence increases when citizen security is weak. In 
Guatemalan communities where insecurity is pervasive, individuals tend to create 
informal safety and justice mechanisms—which may include social cleansing and lynch 
law.401 Adams explains, "When vulnerable citizens cannot count on the state to provide 
them with basic security and legal protection, they respond by taking matters into their 
own hands."402 In 2008, for instance, a rural community in Guatemala reported that one 
out of every 100 homicides was the result of reprisal.403 These statistics illustrate the 
cyclical nature of the problem. Public opinion pools indicate that almost half of the 
Guatemalan population supports violent acts committed by regular citizens in the name of 
justice.404 Therefore, violence has gained social legitimacy in some Guatemalan 
communities because institutional security is weak. 
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Third, the lack of social capital in Guatemala underlies chronic violence.405 One 
could argue that there is an intrinsic and mutually reinforcing relationship between low 
social capital and violent crime. Communities with strong social capital can positively 
influence citizen actions through a cognitive system of trust, positive values, and 
expected behaviors. Nevertheless, when social capital is low or absent, fear and distrust 
prevail, cultivating violent responses among citizens.406 Based on their survey, Moser 
and McIlwaine conclude, "Not surprisingly, [the] widespread climate of fear generated 
other conflicts within communities, some of which were violent in nature."407 Low social 
capital is a common theme in Guatemalan communities, recapitulating the vicious cycle 
of crime and violence.408 
Social capital is intrinsically related to social organization: low levels of social 
organization fragment and isolate citizens.409 This results in social apathy and lack of 
participation in constructive community networks. As one Guatemalan woman explains, 
"No-one gets involved in the lives of others."410 When crime is high, isolationism 
manifests itself in silent complicity.411 Under these conditions, the social pendulum 
might swing in the opposite direction, motivating individuals to actively join pervasive 
organizations such as gangs and drug cartels. These individuals may side with criminals 
in exchange for a sense of belonging, protection, financial gain, or power.412 
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Conceivably, high social capital—and efficient social structures—prevents violent 
crime.413 
Alternatively, some scholars maintain that social capital might exacerbate the 
incidence of violent crime. For instance, a recent study entitled "Violence and Social 
Capital in Post-Conflict Guatemala" concludes that structural social capital is a potential 
catalyst for violence, as individuals participating in civic activities become more exposed 
and vulnerable to crime.414 To reach this conclusion, the authors differentiate between 
structural social capital and cognitive social capital.415 Consequently, the study reveals 
that while structural social capital may promote violence, cognitive social capital may 
prevent it.416 In terms of structural social capital findings, the study admits a degree of 
bias based on its sample pool and other unknowns, such as the willingness of participants 
to disclose victimization of violent crime.417 Yet these conclusions illustrate the 
complexities underlying social factors and violence and bring to light the subjective 
nature of social capital—and its possible variations from one community to another.  
Evidence suggests that social factors influence the occurrence of violent crime in 
Guatemala. Nevertheless, this thesis does not find a direct causal relationship between 
violence and societal elements. On the contrary, it has found that weak institutions are 
chief factors in the incidence of violent crime in Guatemala. This is not to say that 
individuals, families, and communities do not have a role in motivating violence; rather 
than a direct effect, social factors have an indirect influence, either positive or negative.  
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V. CONCLUSION 
Critical levels of violent crime in Guatemala have international implications. 
Guatemala is approximately 1,300 miles from the United States. To put this distance in 
perspective, it only takes one day to travel by car from Guatemala City to Rio Grande 
City in Texas. Due to this geographic proximity, both nations share economic, political, 
social, and security interests. U.S. policymakers are particularly concerned with 
transnational crime and security threats, including transnational gangs, drug trafficking, 
and human rights violations.418 More recently, the influx at the U.S. border of 
unaccompanied children from Guatemala has gained national attention, illustrating the 
complexity of transnational security problems. Furthermore, some of Guatemala's 
policies for combating crime are incongruent with democratic principles, such as the use 
of military force in domestic issues.419 Regional stability is part of the U.S. political 
agenda, which can only be accomplished with a significant amount of coordination and 
funding. In this context, this concluding chapter discusses policy implications, describes 
current initiatives, and offers recommendations for leaders in the United States and 
Guatemala. Finally, it provides a summary of this thesis' findings.  
A. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Support for effective solutions against crime in Guatemala derives from both U.S. 
concerns and regional pressures, resulting in four major implications for policymakers. 
First, Guatemalans have a strong presence in the United States. The Guatemalan diaspora 
ranks among the sixth largest in the United States with approximately 900,000 
immigrants.420 Additionally, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) estimates that 
more than half of the Guatemalan population in the United States is comprised of illegal 
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immigrants.421 Arguably, cultural and social ties maintained between Guatemalans living 
in the United States and their families in Central America create immigration networks, 
which potentially enable the legal or illegal movement of Guatemalans to the United 
States. Second, some analysts argue that violence and instability will continue in the 
region unless the United States addresses the problem of drug consumption within its 
own borders. According to the CIA's Fact Book, the United States is the largest consumer 
of Latin American cocaine, heroin, and marijuana.422 Consequently, Central American 
leaders attribute some of the responsibility to the United States' inability to curb 
consumption.423 Third, in terms of policy design, some observers contend that while the 
United States supports and funds initiatives in Central America, progress will not occur if 
leaders in the region do not address internal problems such as corruption, injustice, and 
human rights violations.424 As discussed in Chapters III and IV, Guatemala's institutional 
capacity to address security issues is inadequate; hence, international support is 
necessary. It is in the United States best interest to provide assistance to Guatemala.425  
Finally, the effort to alleviate regional security problems does not come cheap for 
the United States. In fiscal year 2015, Guatemala is expected to receive over $77 million 
in aid from the U.S. government, an increase of over 20 percent compared to the previous 
year.426 In relation to its neighboring countries, Guatemala receives the largest allocation 
of assistance funds from the United States (see Table 15).  
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Table 15.   Assistance to Guatemala and Neighboring Countries427   
U.S. Assistance to Guatemala and Neighboring Countries (in millions of dollars) 
Year FY13 FY14 FY 15 
Guatemala 80.8 63.2 77.1 
Honduras 52 41.8 48.2 




14.7 14.4 14.8 
 
U.S. funding supports various initiatives in Guatemala to include institutional 
building and reduction of extreme violence.428 Guatemala collects additional funding 
from the Central America Regional Initiative (CARSI)—a U.S. sponsored regional 
security cooperation program.429 Between 2008 and 2012, Guatemala received 
approximately 22 percent of CARSI's total funds.430 Furthermore, the current U.S. 
administration has requested additional funding for assistance programs in Guatemala, 
which would increase the budget of $65 million in fiscal year 2014 to $221 million in 
fiscal year 2016.431 On January 29, 2015, President Barack Obama requested "an historic 
$1 billion as part of his fiscal year 2016 Budget" to support Central American progress, 
of which $300 million would be allocated to enhance security and $250 million to 
improve governance.432 Because U.S. funding provides a significant amount of financial 
support to Guatemala, it is imperative that these resources are employed effectively.  
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B. CURRENT POLICIES AND INITIATIVES 
Numerous initiatives to promote security in Guatemala have been developed at 
the international, regional, and domestic levels. At the international level, as mentioned in 
Chapter IV, the UN's CICIG has been supporting improvements to the Guatemalan 
judicial system and security apparatus since 2007. Nevertheless, the commission has lost 
support from the current Guatemalan administration, and President Molina has stated that 
he will not renew CICIG's mandate, which expires in September 2015.433 Some 
international observers argue that with the departure of CICIG, Guatemala is likely to 
reverse its progress in the area of justice and security.434 Regarding U.S. strategy in 
Central America, the White House announced its plan to assist the region by promoting 
"prosperity, security and good governance."435 Under this policy, funding and 
interagency programs are intended to help Guatemala achieve shared objectives such as 
improving democratic institutional capacity, stability, and citizen security.436  
At the regional level, the United States has created initiatives such as CARSI and 
defense cooperation programs. CARSI was created in 2008 under the Mérida Initiative 
and became its own organization in 2010.437 This platform offers multi-spectrum 
assistance for Central American nations ranging from security training and equipping to 
social programs and institutional strengthening.438 The U.S. Department of Defense 
(DOD) also supports a variety of security programs in Guatemala. The majority of these 
programs assist counter-drug efforts. For example, U.S. forces provide training for 
Guatemala's Interagency Task Force (IATF) Tecún Umán in the areas of security, 
command and control, and interagency coordination.439  
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Central American countries have organized themselves and created development 
initiatives such as the Central American Integration System (SICA), and Plan Prosperity. 
SICA is an organization focused on regional integration with the general purpose of 
fostering "peace, freedom, democracy, and development."440 Guatemala is one of seven 
members, along with Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, and 
Belize.441 In terms of security, SICA attempts to strengthen democracy and institutional 
capacity as well as to develop a security model for the entire region.442 The United States 
is one of several regional observers and donors supporting SICA. Nevertheless, according 
to a Congressional Research Service report, "Many [analysts] have questioned whether 
SICA has the institutional capacity to manage projects across the Central American 
region."443 As a result, questions remain about SICA's effectiveness.  
In 2014, Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras created the Plan of the Alliance 
for Prosperity in the Northern Triangle, or Plan Prosperity.444 This alliance was created in 
response to the increase of unaccompanied children from the Northern Triangle of 
Central America illegally crossing into the United States.445 The plan outlines strategic 
actions that include enhancing security, justice, institutional capacity, and citizen trust in 
the government.446 In March 2015, Vice President Joe Biden met with the presidents of 
Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador in Guatemala City to discuss country-specific 
commitments to the plan. The Northern Triangle nations agreed to implement joint 
actions to foster the region and President Molina agreed to introduce legislation for 
judicial system reforms and to develop stronger anti-corruption mechanisms. The Vice 
President indicated that—in addition to the proposed $1 billion in assistance to Central 
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America in fiscal year 2016—the current administration would try to increase financial 
support to the region the fiscal year 2015.447 
At the domestic level, Guatemala created the National Pact for Security, Justice 
and Peace in 2012 with the purpose of addressing security and justice problems. This 
initiative attempts to coordinate interagency efforts dealing with citizen security.448 The 
program also launched the Vice Ministry of Prevention (VMP) with a focus on deterring 
social factors that enable violence, such as intra-family violence and youth neglect.449 
Furthermore, the pact aims to introduce a state presence in areas where the structure of 
the government is lacking.450 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The United States and Guatemala have the opportunity to work together and 
devise policies that effectively contain and decrease violent crime. Even though 
insecurity is a troubling theme between the nations, the United States continues to have a 
good bilateral relationship with Guatemala. As such, addressing transnational crime and 
violence is at the center of U.S. foreign policy. Consequently, this thesis indicates that the 
causes of violence in Guatemala are predominantly linked to institutional capacity and, to 
an extent, social factors. Based on these findings, the following sections offer 
recommendations for U.S. and Guatemalan policymakers.  
1. Institution-Centric Recommendations  
In the security context, increasing democratic institutional capacity is paramount. 
First, the Guatemalan government must empower its judicial system, create legislation to 
improve the rule of law, and fully reject impunity. Furthermore, the judiciary should 
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focus on developing accountability mechanisms to combat corruption and clientelism. 
Second, police reform must continue with emphasis on incentives for performance and 
transparency at the individual and institutional levels. The national police should also 
implement clearer standards and procedures that foster accountability and eliminate the 
use of mano dura tactics. Moreover, the number of properly trained police officers should 
be increased to satisfy the UN's recommendation of 222 officers per 100,000 citizens. 
Finally, Guatemala must improve civilian control over the military. The militarization of 
domestic security forces should be reconsidered and the mission of the armed forces 
realigned with national defense, boarder security, peacekeeping, and disaster relief. 
2. Strategic Recommendations 
In addition to democratic institutional reform and strengthening in Guatemala, 
stakeholders have the opportunity to organically work together on comprehensive and 
integrated approaches to the security problem. The following recommendations address 
strategic solutions. 
a.  CARSI: Embrace Accountability  
Strengthen CARSI through clear and measurable goal-setting and accountability 
for distributed funds. As previously mentioned, CARSI focuses on the development of 
institutional capacity and security mechanisms. The initiative's main goals include 
fostering safer communities, disrupting crime networks, improving governance, 
developing state presence, and facilitating cooperation among partners.451 To meet these 
objectives, CARSI has received over $800 million from the U.S. government since fiscal 
year 2008.452 Nevertheless, a Congressional Research Report indicates that CARSI has 
not reported tangible results: "It is unclear what has been accomplished with the funding 
appropriated thus far since U.S. agencies have not released the metrics they are using to 
assess the initiative’s performance."453 The available literature indicates that while 
CARSI has potential to foster security in the region, it has yet to deliver tangible results 
                                                
451 Meyer and Seelke, Central America Regional Security Initiative, 21–22. 
452 Ibid., 36. 
453 Ibid. 
 96 
on many of its pilot programs.454 Therefore, policymakers and other leaders involved in 
this initiative should ensure CARSI meets short-term goals and proactively demonstrates 
progress toward long-term goals. Furthermore, full cooperation and political will from 
Central American leaders is fundamental for CARSI's effectiveness, and funding should 
only take place under such conditions.455 Finally, policymakers should enable CARSI to 
play a pivotal role in judiciary reform and fill the vacuum left behind by CICIG's 
scheduled departure. 
b. Fusion Centers: Coordination and Information Exchange 
Create intelligence fusion centers and a regional fusion center network. Some 
analysts suggest that funding and security programs from various domestic and 
international agencies in Guatemala have conflicting objectives, poor coordination, and 
duplication of effort.456 In agreement with Bruneau, who proposes the creation of fusion 
centers to combat gang activity in the Northern Triangle, this thesis suggests that fusion 
centers could systematically combat violent crime in Guatemala and the region.457 A 
fusion centers is defined as "a collaborative effort of two or more agencies that provide 
resources, expertise and information to the center with the goal of maximizing their 
ability to detect, prevent, investigate, and respond to criminal and terrorist activity."458 
These centers are nodes of interagency communication in which critical operational 
capabilities include receiving, analyzing, disseminating, and gathering security 
information.459 In the United States, for instance, fusion centers facilitate communication 
between state and federal agencies. As a result, the National Network of Fusion Centers 
plays a key role in the Information Sharing Environment (ISE), which focuses on the 
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protection of national security.460 The United States, Guatemala, and other donor 
countries should work in partnership to develop similar fusion centers in Guatemala. 
These centers could mitigate coordination problems, streamline efforts, improve the 
exchange of information, and foster effectiveness.461 Furthermore, the development of 
regional centers in the Northern Triangle could assist in the coordination of transnational 
security efforts and prevent the displacement of crime from one region to another, also 
known as the "balloon effect."462  
c. Social Development: Security by Design 
Create an environment that fosters social development and security. This thesis 
has concluded that social factors have a secondary, nevertheless noticeable, effect on the 
incidence of violent crime. Therefore, Guatemala's government should address societal 
problems and invest in community-level infrastructure as a way for social empowerment. 
The city of Medellin in Colombia exemplifies what strong leadership and community 
investment can do for the security sphere. In 2004, mathematician Sergio Fajardo became 
the mayor of Medellin and immediately started investing in infrastructure, focusing on 
education and social participation.463 According to Carolina Rivera et al., the mayor 
wanted "to transform the community’s behaviors by improving [citizens'] physical, 
cultural and educational environments."464 His efforts led to the creation of 20 new 
schools and five library parks, including the internationally acclaimed Library España in 
an underserved neighborhood. The results of Fajardo's vision are encouraging: homicide 
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rates in Medellin have dropped by 80 percent since their peak in 1991.465 Medellin is still 
vulnerable to violence and some argue that other factors have caused the city's drop in 
violent crime.466 Nevertheless, Medellin's security transformation has been recognized 
worldwide, offering the prospect that security can be improved by design.  
D. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
The purpose of this thesis was to identify the causes of violent crime in post-
conflict Guatemala. Furthermore, it sought to evaluate transnational implications for U.S. 
policymakers. While accounts of violent crime in Guatemala are widely available, 
theories for understanding and resolving the nation's violence problem are rare. Hence, 
this research contributes to the conceptualization of causes of violence and crime 
exclusively for Guatemala. Through the study of theoretical frameworks and thematic 
arguments, this work initially hypothesized that a combination of weak institutional 
performance and a lack of social incentives caused violent crime in Guatemala. The 
baseline for the hypothesis was the evaluation of Guatemala's democratic system. A 
preliminary analysis demonstrated that Guatemala is not a consolidated democracy; more 
specifically, drawing from Schedler's theoretical framework, Guatemala is a completing 
democracy—an electoral democracy moving toward liberal democracy. A selection of 
possible arguments supporting the hypothesis led to four areas of study: the judicial 
system, police reform, civilian control over the military, and social factors.  
This thesis determined that a flawed judicial system, inadequate police reform, 
and weak civil control over the armed forces have a direct causal effect on violent crime 
in Guatemala. Furthermore, the analysis of social factors demonstrated that these are not 
causal in nature but rather influential elements in the occurrence of violence; at a 
minimum, key societal variables and violent crime share a correlational relationship that 
is cyclical and mutually reinforcing. These findings are illustrated in Figure 10. 
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Figure 10.  Causes of Violent Crime in Guatemala 
This study emphasizes the role of weak democratic governance in the high incidence of 
violent crime in Guatemala. In this conceptualization, weak institutions are the 
independent variables and violent crime is the dependent variable. Nevertheless, as the 
diagram demonstrates, this structure is more complex than the stated binary relationship. 
Therefore, it is also necessary to recognize the influence of other socioeconomic 
factors—intra-family violence, citizen support of violence, and lack of social capital—on 
Guatemala's security structure. In this context, further work is needed to fully understand 
the implications of these secondary and tertiary elements. Finally, this thesis calls for 
action at the institutional and strategic levels, identifying opportunities and making 
recommendations for U.S. and Guatemalan policymakers to mitigate one of Guatemala's 
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